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“Solidity”
soliditylang.orgadvisory🛡️ Security

Yul Optimizer Knowledge Base Stale Bookkeeping Bug

Solidity advisory on a Yul optimizer bug in the KnowledgeBase, present in versions 0.8.19 to 0.8.37 and fixed in 0.8.38. Stale cached address offsets let LoadResolver and EqualStoreEliminator treat coinciding memory or storage slots as distinct, so loads return outdated values or needed stores are dropped. It includes a pure-Solidity reproducer for --via-ir, a Sourcify scan with no differing bytecode, and checks for deployed contracts. Rated low severity.

SolidityYulSourcify+1
Ethereum Foundation bug bountyDaniel BoyeSurya Prakash Akula+4

AppSec· Published and added 22 Oct 2026

ethereum-magicians.orgthread🧠 AI

Draft ERC: Agentic Resource Discovery (ARD) Onchain — an address-rooted value registry whose records are ARD entries

Ethereum Magicians draft ERC proposing an onchain, address-rooted registry beneath Google's Agentic Resource Discovery (ARD) spec. Every record remains a valid ARD entry. It adds four kinds (skill, task, agent, registry), CAIP-19/CAIP-10 anchors, JCS+SHA-256 descriptor hashes and domain claims collected as endorsements. A Solidity/Foundry reference kernel with four adapters and a Node.js resolver/gateway are included; the gateway passes the official ARD conformance CLI. The author asks for feedback on the address-as-root boundary, the envelope exclusion from the hash, same-chain-only anchors, and the proposed application/ai-task+json payload.

EthereumSolidityNode.js+9
Agentic Resource DiscoveryGoogleMicrosoft+2

agents, mcp· Published and added 13 Oct 2026

ethereum-magicians.orgthread🧠 AI

ERC-8444: Agentic Resource Discovery (ARD) Onchain

An Ethereum Magicians proposal for ERC-8444, which adds an onchain value and settlement layer under Google's Agentic Resource Discovery (ARD) spec for finding MCP servers, A2A agents, skills and APIs. A thin kernel records kind (skill, task, agent, registry), a CAIP-19/CAIP-10 anchor, a JCS+SHA-256 descriptor hash, a canonical URN and a status. Authority belongs to the paid address, and domains act as collected endorsements through /.well-known/ard.json. The reference implementation has Foundry-tested Solidity adapters and a Node.js gateway that passes the official ARD conformance CLI. It introduces a "task" kind (application/ai-task+json) for tenders aimed at suppliers, and the author asks for feedback on the trust root, the hash scope, same-chain anchors and the task payload.

Model Context ProtocolEthereumSolidity+2
GoogleMicrosoftHugging Face

mcp, agents· Added 14 Oct 2026, published 13 Oct 2026

soliditylang.orgadvisory🛡️ Security

Solidity 0.8.37 Release Announcement

Official release notes for Solidity v0.8.37 detailing three bug-bounty-reported compiler bugs: memory `delete` on a bytes-array element zeroing a full 32-byte word instead of one byte (corrupting adjacent memory, evmasm pipeline, up to v0.8.36); a stack-to-memory spill-slot collision under mutual recursion in the IR pipeline (`--via-ir`, v0.7.2–v0.8.36) that silently overwrites live variables; and named custom-error arguments in `require(...)` being ABI-encoded in call-site order rather than declaration order, so revert data misrepresents error values (v0.8.36 introduced but only affects revert data). Also covers two non-security miscompilations (uninitialized packed function pointers, checked/unchecked constant reuse), a new SSA-CFG stack shuffler, Amsterdam EVM's SLOTNUM opcode support, and removal/deprecation of LSP mode, Generic Solidity, and several EVM version pragmas.

SolidityEthereum
shaheenfazimNg Sze HonCarl (Cantina Security)+3

Blockchain· Added 29 Sep 2026

arxiv.orgpaper🛡️ Security

Solidity Meets LLMs: A Transformer-Based Approach to Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection

This arXiv paper fine-tunes a BERT-based transformer model on a purpose-built labeled dataset of Solidity code fragments to classify them as vulnerable or safe, reporting a 92% F1 score. It demonstrates applying pre-trained LLM representations to capture Solidity-specific syntactic and semantic patterns for smart contract vulnerability detection, as an alternative or complement to traditional static analysis tools.

SolidityEthereumLLM+1

AI Security, AppSec· Added 4 Oct 2026, published 22 Sep 2026

github.comrepo🛡️ Security

shinthink/blitzstrike

Blitz Strike is an open-source Model Context Protocol server (TypeScript/Bun) that packages a structured 3-tier pentesting methodology — BLITZ (attack-surface recon), EAGLE-EYE (source-to-sink reachability tracing), and STRIKE (live validation before reporting) — into callable tools any MCP client (Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini, etc.) can drive with a single run_engagement call. It ships 130 self-written security tools, 317 indexed tool manuals, 58 data-driven escalation chains with negative-control checks, a Web3/Solidity audit module with Foundry proofs, and a regression/benchmark suite (453 checks, reported 1.0 detection / 0 false-positive rate) to make every finding verified rather than pattern-matched.

Model Context ProtocolBunTypeScript+3
IDORSSRFPayloadsAllTheThings+3

Offensive Security, AI Security, AppSec· Added 2 Oct 2026, published 12 Sep 2026

soliditylang.orgadvisory🛡️ Security

Memory Byte Array Element Delete Clears Whole Word Bug

The Solidity team disclosed a code-generator bug (reported by Shaheen Fazim via the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program) where `delete b[i]` on a bytes/string element located in memory incorrectly writes a full 32-byte zero word instead of a single byte, corrupting up to 31 subsequent bytes — either later elements of the same array or, for elements near the array's end, adjacent memory allocations like other variables. The bug affects only the default evmasm pipeline (not the IR pipeline via --via-ir) in all versions up to and including 0.8.36, is fixed in 0.8.37, and the equivalent assignment `b[i] = 0` is unaffected and serves as a workaround. A Sourcify scan of ~870,000 verified compilations found the triggering pattern in only two functions, neither actually exploitable in practice.

SolidityEthereum
Shaheen FazimEthereum Foundation bug bounty programSourcify

Blockchain· Added 29 Sep 2026, published 10 Sep 2026

soliditylang.orgadvisory🛡️ Security

Spill Slot Collision Across Mutual Recursion Bug

The Solidity team disclosed a compiler bug (fixed in Solidity 0.8.37) where the IR pipeline's stack-to-memory spill mechanism can assign the same fixed memory offset ("spill slot") to two simultaneously-live local variables when a contract's call graph contains mutual recursion, silently corrupting values without any revert or warning. The bug requires --via-ir compilation plus a narrow set of conditions (mutual recursion, >16 live locals in reachable non-recursive functions, a variable read back after the recursive call) and affects Solidity 0.7.2 through 0.8.36; a rescan of ~319,000 Sourcify-verified contracts found no affected deployments. The writeup includes full technical detail on the buggy depth-first slot allocator, an annotated PoC contract reproducing the silent overwrite, and the strongly-connected-component fix.

SolidityEthereum
Ng Sze HonEthereum Foundation bug bounty programUnsound Spill In Mutual Recursion Bug+1

Blockchain· Added 29 Sep 2026, published 10 Sep 2026

soliditylang.orgadvisory🛡️ Security

Solidity 0.8.37 Release Announcement

Solidity 0.8.37 release notes disclosing three EF bug-bounty-reported compiler bugs with security implications: deleting an element of a memory bytes array (or converted string) zeroed the full 32-byte word instead of one byte, corrupting adjacent data in the evmasm pipeline (all versions ≤0.8.36); a stack-to-memory spill-slot collision in mutually recursive functions under --via-ir silently overwrote live variables (0.7.2–0.8.36); and require() with a custom error using named arguments encoded parameters in call-site rather than declaration order, producing structurally valid but semantically wrong revert data. The release also adds two non-security miscompilation fixes, an experimental planning-based stack shuffler for the SSA CFG backend, support for the Amsterdam EVM's SLOTNUM opcode (EIP-7843), and removes/deprecates several experimental features.

SolidityEthereum
shaheenfazimNg Sze HonCantina Security+2

Blockchain· Added 29 Sep 2026, published 10 Sep 2026

soliditylang.orgadvisory🛡️ Security

Misordered Named Parameters in require with Custom Errors Bug

The Solidity team discloses a bug (reported by Cantina Security via the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty) where the IR-based (--via-ir) code generator pushed named custom-error arguments in call-site order instead of declaration order before ABI-encoding, corrupting revert data for require(condition, ErrorName({...})) calls with reordered named parameters. Introduced in Solidity 0.8.26 and fixed in 0.8.37, the bug produces silently swapped or type-confused values in decoded revert data with no compiler warning, and can cause misaligned encoding in multi-slot-argument cases that either reverts with undecodable data or produces a plausible-but-wrong payload - a real concern for standards like ERC-3668 (CCIP Read) that treat revert data as part of the contract interface. Severity was rated "very low" since the affected transaction is already reverting and there is no attacker-controlled exploitation path, but audits of via-ir contracts using named custom-error arguments should check for it.

SolidityEthereum
Cantina SecurityEthereum FoundationERC-3668+1

Blockchain· Added 29 Sep 2026, published 10 Sep 2026

github.comrepo🛡️ Security

pashov/skills

pashov/skills is a set of Claude Code "skills" built by Pashov Audit Group that turn an AI coding agent into a Solidity security auditor: an "x-ray" command for quick codebase reconnaissance, a "solidity auditor" mode that runs multiple different agent personas over a codebase (or specified files) looking for vulnerabilities, and a "fizz" command for additional automated checks. It packages smart-contract audit tradecraft into reusable AI agent skills rather than a standalone scanner, letting developers or auditors invoke deep, multi-pass Solidity review directly inside their coding assistant.

Claude CodeSolidityEthereum
Pashov Audit Group

AI Security, AppSec· Published and added 7 Sep 2026

github.comrepo🛡️ Security

PlamenTSV/plamen

Plamen is an open-source Python orchestrator that drives 18-100 Claude Code or OpenAI Codex CLI agents across 40+ phases to autonomously audit smart contracts (EVM/Solidity, Solana/Anchor, Aptos Move, Sui Move, Soroban, DAML/Canton) and L1 node-client infrastructure (Go/Rust consensus, p2p, mempool code), producing a severity-tiered AUDIT_REPORT.md with verified proof-of-concept exploits for each finding. It integrates MCP servers for Slither, ChromaDB and Solodit, ingests vulnerability corpora from Solodit, DeFiHackLabs and Immunefi to ground findings, and runs a PTY-supervised worker-pool architecture with checkpoint/resume, artifact-based completion gating, and a dedicated L1 mode with consensus-invariant and network-surface depth agents.

Claude CodeCodex CLIModel Context Protocol+3
Trail of BitsImmunefiSolodit

AppSec, AI Security· Published and added 7 Sep 2026

x.comthread🛡️ Security

Pyro (@0x3b33) on X

A roundup of three open-source AI-assisted smart contract security scanners: pashov/skills (solidity-auditor + x-ray pre-audit + fuzz suite generation, fast/cheap feedback), PlamenTSV's autonomous 8-phase agent covering EVM, Solana, and Move that ships PoCs with findings, and Trail of Bits' skills repo with 40+ security skills for contract audits, differential review, and static analysis. Useful pointer to emerging AI-agent-based smart contract auditing tooling.

SolidityEthereumSolana+1

AppSec, AI Security· Published and added 7 Sep 2026

github.comrepo🛡️ Security

VaultKeepR/vaultkeepr-public

vaultkeepr-public is the MIT-licensed repository behind VaultKeepR, a zero-knowledge password manager. It holds 15 SDK packages published to npm under @vaultkeepr and Solidity contracts on Base L2 that anchor vault locations, recovery fragments and digital legacy, tested with Foundry. Encryption is XChaCha20-Poly1305 with Argon2id (t=3, m=64 MiB, p=4), and docs/THREAT_MODEL.md covers assets, adversaries and trust boundaries. Clients stay in a private repository.

VaultKeepRSolidityFoundry+3
XChaCha20-Poly1305Argon2id

Identity & Access· Added 23 Oct 2026, published 12 Aug 2026

github.comrepo🛡️ Security

AuditSentry

AuditSentry is a GitHub project that pairs Claude Code with 13 specialized MCP servers and 23 parallel AI agents to audit Solidity and Vyper smart contracts, generating vulnerability findings, working exploit PoCs, mainnet-fork simulations, and CVSS-scored audit reports. It targets DeFi-specific bug classes (reentrancy, oracle manipulation, flash loan attacks, ERC-4626 inflation, cross-chain messaging replay, L2 sequencer issues, ERC-4337 account abstraction) and claims results benchmarked against 150+ historical Code4rena/Sherlock contest findings.

Claude CodeModel Context ProtocolSolidity+3

AppSec, AI Security· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 10 Aug 2026

0xsimao.comwriteup🛡️ Security

0xSimao Findings Database

0xSimao's public findings database aggregates smart contract audit results from many independent engagements, cataloging dozens of critical/high/medium/low severity bugs such as ERC4626 vault accounting errors, missing slippage controls, incorrect ICR/debt tracking in leveraged vault "Den" systems, cross-chain state desynchronization via LayerZero in a CDS/borrowing protocol, inflation attacks on ERC4626 shares, and DoS conditions from bad-debt checks. It covers protocols spanning leveraged vaults, lending/liquidation engines, Uniswap-based strategies, Maple/Sky/Aave yield strategies, an IDO launchpad, and a GameFi/DeFi hybrid ("Codeup"), providing concrete real-world examples of DeFi/Solidity vulnerability classes and fixes.

SolidityEthereum

AppSec· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 1 Aug 2026

github.comrepo🛡️ Security

Damn Vulnerable DeFi

Damn Vulnerable DeFi is a Foundry-based Solidity smart contract security playground featuring intentionally vulnerable challenges around flashloans, price oracles, governance, NFTs, DEXs, lending pools, smart contract wallets, timelocks, vaults, meta-transactions, and upgradeability. Each challenge presents a prompt and vulnerable contracts; solvers write a Foundry test exploiting the flaw to drain funds or bypass restrictions, making it a benchmark for both human auditors and automated security tooling.

SolidityFoundryEthereum

Learning, AppSec· Published and added 31 Jul 2026

github.comrepo🛡️ Security

Slither

Slither, developed by Trail of Bits, is a Python3-based static analysis framework for Solidity and Vyper smart contracts that runs a suite of vulnerability detectors, visualizes contract internals via 'printers', and exposes an API for writing custom analyses using its SlithIR intermediate representation. It integrates into Hardhat/Foundry/Brownie builds and CI (including GitHub code scanning), claims 99.9% parse coverage of public Solidity code and sub-second average analysis time per contract, and ships companion tools like slither-check-upgradeability, slither-prop, and slither-read-storage.

SolidityPythonFoundry+3
Trail of Bits

AppSec· Published and added 31 Jul 2026

github.comrepo🛡️ Security

Web3 Security Tools Hub

A curated GitHub repo cataloging AI tools for smart-contract security auditing, split into free/open-source and paid/closed-source categories and organized by chain/language: Solidity/EVM, Rust/Solana, Move/Sui, ZK/Circom, and multi-language tools. Maintained by pashov, it's meant as a directory for finding AI-assisted auditing tooling rather than a single tool itself.

SolidityEthereumRust+3

AI Security, AppSec· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 31 Jul 2026

paradigm.xyzarticle🛡️ Security

Solidus: Formally Verifying a Compiler Using Automated Research

Paradigm introduces Solidus, a project to build a formally verified Solidity-to-EVM compiler written in Lean, aimed at eliminating compiler-bug vulnerabilities like the one behind a $50M+ smart contract hack in July 2023. The already-verified Yul-to-EVM backend (built on a modified fork of Nethermind's Yul/EVM semantics, comparable to Powdr's yul-compiler) was produced almost entirely through ~1,700 hours of agentic "automated research" using Codex, GPT-5.6, Harmonic's Aristotle prover, and Claude Fable 5, with no human writing code. Two public challenges are launched: "Spec Hunt" to find divergences between the new solidity-lean formal semantics and real Solidity behavior (via Foundry-based PoCs reviewed by an AI agent), and a compiler-optimization challenge requiring submissions to shrink bytecode size while preserving the existing correctness proof.

SolidityEthereumCodex+3
NethermindPowdrHarmonic Aristotle+3

Blockchain, AI Security· Added 4 Oct 2026, published 24 Jul 2026

paradigm.xyzarticle🧠 AI

Solidus: Formally Verifying a Compiler Using Automated Research

Paradigm describes Solidus, a project to build a formally verified Solidity compiler in Lean, built almost entirely via autonomous AI agent research loops (Codex running GPT-5.6 for ~1,700 hours, plus Harmonic's Aristotle proof assistant and Claude Fable 5) with no human writing or reading code. The piece details the verified Yul-to-EVM backend, a new formal semantics for Solidity, the engineering/proof tradeoffs that still required human judgment (spec drift, proof architecture choices), and two public 'Solidus challenges' (Spec Hunt and Compiler Optimization) inviting contributors to extend the work, with AI agents reviewing submissions. It's a concrete case study of long-horizon agentic research combined with formal verification (Lean) as a mechanism for trustless collaboration and optimization.

LeanSolidityCodex+2
ParadigmGPT-5.6Claude Fable 5+7

agents, coding-agents· Added 4 Oct 2026, published 24 Jul 2026

github.comrepo🛡️ Security

BountyForge

BountyForge is a Claude Code skill that spins up 8 specialized agents in parallel to hunt for vulnerabilities across web/API, smart contracts (EVM, Move, Solana, TRON), infrastructure, and supply-chain targets, then deduplicates and runs findings through a four-gate validation pipeline (Refutation, Reachability, Trigger, Impact) before CVSS-scoring them into submission-ready HackerOne/Bugcrowd/Intigriti/Immunefi reports. It orchestrates local tools (nmap, ffuf, sqlmap, amass, ZAP, Burp Suite) when Claude Code execution is enabled, integrates with a companion `bug-bounty-intelligence-mcp` MCP server for Solidity scanning via "Al-Mizaan v3" 7-gate deep validation, and also offers a paid Firecracker-microVM cloud version at bountyforge.xyz.

Claude CodeModel Context ProtocolSolidity+3
IDORSSRFAl-Mizaan v3+1

Offensive Security, AI Security, AppSec· Published and added 22 Jul 2026

github.comrepo🛡️ Security

Awesome AI Web3 Security

A curated, verified awesome-list of AI-powered tools for smart contract and blockchain security, covering autonomous auditor agents (Hound, Plamen, Aether, SolidityGuard), commercial AI audit platforms (Sherlock AI, Cantina Apex, Zellic V12, Nethermind AuditAgent), MCP-based auditing plugins (Trail of Bits Skills, Claudit, Slither MCP, Solodit MCP Server), real-time on-chain ML monitoring (Forta Network, AnChain.AI), and benchmark/training datasets (EVMbench, SCONE-bench, ScaBench, SmartBugs). Every entry requires a real AI/ML/LLM component plus a specific Web3 security focus, with open-source entries needing 25+ GitHub stars, positioning it as a practical index for the emerging AI-driven smart-contract-audit tooling ecosystem.

SolidityEthereumSolana+3
Trail of BitsCertoraForta Network+9

AI Security, AppSec· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 18 Jul 2026

github.comrepo🛡️ Security

EVM Hack Analyzer

EVM Hack Analyzer is a static, backend-free, in-browser debugger that forks chain state at a historical transaction, replays it in an in-browser EVM (@ethereumjs/vm), pulls verified Solidity sources from Etherscan, and produces a pc-to-source-line map so researchers can step through a real exploit opcode-by-opcode or line-by-line. It supports both native replay of a historical tx hash and loading pre-built scripted exploit ZIPs from the companion evm-hack-poc dataset (mirroring DeFiHackLabs and crypto.training/hacks), letting users annotate the vulnerable line and exploit steps, then export/share a self-contained PoC via ZIP or IPFS. It's aimed at smart-contract vulnerability research and community-sourced exploit PoC archiving, entirely client-side with no server or persistent backend required.

SolidityEthereumIPFS+2
DeFiHackLabs

Offensive Security· Added 3 Sep 2026, published 18 Jul 2026

soliditylang.orgadvisory🛡️ Security

Solidity 0.8.36 Release Announcement

Solidity 0.8.36 release notes disclose two medium-severity compiler bugs: a Yul optimizer call-cycle detection flaw that let stack-to-memory spilling be wrongly applied to mutually recursive functions, causing separate invocations to share and overwrite the same memory slots; and a storage-layout warning bug that could reverse the AST's linearizedBaseContracts annotation when a contract's variables sit very close to the end of storage, corrupting constructor/state-variable initialization order. The release also adds experimental stack-to-memory spilling to the new SSA-form CFG code generator (behind --experimental --via-ssa-cfg) and removes the now-obsolete experimental EOF backend after EOF's rejection from the Fusaka upgrade.

Solidity
Unsound Spill In Mutual Recursion BugInheritance Order Reversal On Storage End Warning Bug

Blockchain· Added 29 Sep 2026, published 9 Jul 2026

soliditylang.orgadvisory🛡️ Security

Inheritance Order Reversal On Storage End Warning Bug

The Solidity team discloses a medium-severity compiler bug present from Solidity 0.8.29 through 0.8.35 (fixed in 0.8.36): the code that emits Warning 3495 (custom storage layout too close to storage end) uses ranges-v3's actions::reverse instead of views::reverse, permanently mutating the linearizedBaseContracts AST annotation instead of only reading a reversed copy. Because that annotation drives inheritance-order decisions throughout analysis and codegen, affected contracts can get reversed constructor execution order, wrong super/virtual-function and virtual-modifier resolution, and incorrect fallback/receive dispatch — either silently miscompiling or triggering internal compiler errors. Exploitation requires a contract using both inheritance and a `layout at` clause landing within the last 2^64 storage slots, a pattern the team found no real-world evidence of via GitHub and Sourcify scans.

Solidity
Warning 3495ranges-v3actions::reverse+4

Blockchain· Added 29 Sep 2026, published 9 Jul 2026