0xSimao Findings Database

What it is

The 0xSimao Findings Database is a per-engagement listing of smart-contract audit findings, grouped by codebase and tagged Crit/High, Medium, Low/Info with IDs (H-1, M-2, 3S-MORE-C01, etc.). Each entry names the exact function and the failure mechanism. Beyond the protocol list in the summary, the visible portion surfaces concrete, recurring exploit primitives worth using as an audit checklist for ERC4626 vaults, leveraged/CDP systems, and cross-chain LayerZero designs.

Recurring mechanisms the page names

• Unauthenticated flash-loan callback drain: LoopStrategy::onMoreFlashLoan() does not verify the caller is the market, letting an attacker call it directly and steal collateral (3S-MORE-C01). Paired with an unvalidated path in redeem/withdraw() that lets an attacker drain via mismatched buy/sell tokens (3S-MORE-C02).
• ERC4626 inflation attack on share minting (3S-MORE-M02); bad-debt DoS where any function relying on totalAssets() — including 4626 functions that must not revert — reverts once bad debt exists (L-9).
• Uniswap slot0 tick misuse: main position ticks set from slot0.tick are inaccurate near a tick border, causing wrong allocation and fund loss (H-2); negative-tick modulo errors cause active-when-should-be-inactive positions and division by zero (M-6).
• Precision loss: Vault::_calcDeposit() multiplies three 18-decimal quantities (1e54) leaving ~1e23 headroom, overflowing for low-priced tokens (M-1).
• LayerZero non-atomic state overwrite: lacking a lock, cross-chain global state (cdsPoolValue, totalCdsDepositedAmount, liquidation indices) is overwritten between chains (H-26, H-19, H-20), plus unbounded debt inflation via repeatedly calling calculateCumulativeRate() because lastEventTime is never updated (H-21).
• Leverage/ICR edge failures: executeWithdrawalEpoch() DoSes at the minimum-debt limit and asserts against a never-set prevICR (M-2, M-3); increase/decrease leverage revert near debt limits (M-4, M-5).
• Token-compatibility footguns: missing safeERC20/safeApprove for non-standard tokens; address.transfer (2300 gas) risking stuck funds on zkSync and smart-contract wallets; missing disableInitializers().

What to do

Use the database as a targeted review checklist when auditing or shipping similar code:

• Validate msg.sender in every flash-loan/hook callback; validate swap path endpoints.
• Add slippage bounds on deposits, donations, and withdrawals (shares/amount minimums, real deadlines).
• Guard ERC4626 against inflation attacks and ensure totalAssets()/preview functions cannot revert on bad debt.
• Read TWAP, not slot0, for pricing/allocation; handle negative-tick modulo.
• For cross-chain designs, serialize/lock global-state mutations and update time/nonce trackers on every accrual.

Caveats

Only the first ~60,000 of 161,613 characters were fetched, ending mid-PoolTogether (PrizePool/TieredLiquidityDistributor). Later engagements are not shown; this is not a complete inventory. Entries are one-line descriptions without full PoC or fix diffs (some note "Addressed in <commit>"); treat them as leads, not verified reproductions.