
LLM Parkinsonism: Uncertainty-Aware Global Executive Control Architecture for Autonomous LM Agents
This paper names "LLM Parkinsonism" - the tendency of autonomous LM agents to keep acting (over-verifying, over-refining, repairing self-created complexity) after a task's goal is already met - and traces it to proposal generation, scope interpretation, progress assessment, and stopping authority all being concentrated in the same self-conditioned loop. It introduces Global Executive Control (GEC) v0.2, an uncertainty-aware governance layer that separates action generation from project-level control (scope, evidence, resource use, stopping), and evaluates it in a 24,000-episode matched-candidate benchmark under a 40,000-token ceiling: a first-candidate baseline hits 67.42% hard-goal success, a candidate-set control reaches 96.53%, and GEC matches that success (96.57%) while cutting mean token use about 36%. The results are from mechanistic simulations only; the authors flag live-model validation as still needed.
What it claims
The headline result is narrower than the 96.57% figure suggests. In the 24,000-episode benchmark (40,000-token ceiling), most of the jump from 67.42% to roughly 96.5% hard-goal success comes from giving the agent access to several candidate actions. GEC itself adds nothing beyond that: a candidate-set local control reaches 96.53% without GEC.
What GEC adds over that control is cost and discipline:
- Mean tokens: down from 19,782 to 12,574 (36.4%).
- Restricted mean tokens to completion: down from 16,136 to 13,114 (18.7%) at the 40,000-token ceiling.
- Pre-completion drift: the measured drift is eliminated.
- Complexity: gross complexity drops sharply.
If you adopt only one idea, generating and choosing among candidate actions buys the success. Governance buys the efficiency.
How it works
- Goal Contract. The project is a contract G = (g, R_H, R_S, N, C, M):
- a primary goal
- hard requirements
- explicitly authorized soft objectives
- explicit non-goals
- constraints
- an amendment policy
An LLM proposal is not a requirement. Contract changes are revisioned amendment events authorized outside the executor. The reference implementation rejects anonymous or self-authorized amendments, which targets "self-generated requirement promotion" (for example, an optional "site-level alert aggregation" idea later being treated as a committed feature with tests).
- Independent scope adjudication. Each action gets a scope label: DIRECT, PREREQUISITE, VERIFICATION, RISK_MITIGATION, SOFT, NONE or FORBIDDEN. The generator's own label is not authoritative. The adjudicator could be a dependency graph, rule engine, separate model, human or ensemble; what matters is the separation of authority. NONE and FORBIDDEN actions count as unscoped unless the contract is amended.
- State-versioned evidence. Evidence for a criterion is stored as (status, verifier, state version, confidence, dependencies). Later changes can invalidate it, so a test that passed at version k does not certify completion at version k+m.
- Two-level stopping. Candidate actions are scored as V = E[ΔU] − λ_T·C_T − λ_K·C_K − λ_R·C_R − λ_V·C_V. That is expected verified utility gain minus weighted token, complexity, risk and verification costs.
- A low score (V ≤ τ) rejects that candidate only. It does not stop the project.
- Stopping is a state-level judgment over the whole candidate set.
- Unmet hard requirements with no feasible path end in BLOCKED, not GOOD ENOUGH.
- Stopping for economic reasons applies only after hard completion.
flowchart TD
G[Generator proposes candidates] --> S{Independent scope adjudicator}
S -->|NONE / FORBIDDEN| R[Reject unless contract amended]
S -->|DIRECT / PREREQ / VERIFY / RISK / SOFT| V{Action score V > τ?}
V -->|no| R
V -->|yes| X[Execute]
X --> E[Versioned evidence; invalidate stale]
E --> H{Hard goals met with valid evidence?}
H -->|no, path exists| G
H -->|no, no path| B[BLOCKED]
H -->|yes| C{Any soft continuation worth cost?}
C -->|yes| G
C -->|no| D[STOP]Evidence
The paper reports the following metrics, all from the LPB v0.2 benchmark:
- Restricted mean tokens to completion (RMTTC_B). Episodes that fail to complete count as the full budget B rather than being dropped, which avoids survivorship bias. The paper treats conditional tokens-to-completion as secondary only.
- Termination Overrun Ratio (TOR). Measures the tail of work after the goal is complete.
- Pre-completion drift rate (GDR_pre). Kept separate from TOR so the two are not double-counted.
- Useful-token ratios. A direct ratio and a process ratio. The process ratio credits validated prerequisites and verification work.
The governance-overhead sensitivity analysis stayed favorable up to an extra 500 synthetic governance tokens per cycle. This is a rough budget for what a live adjudicator could cost before the savings disappear.
According to the paper, LPB v0.2 includes:
- matched candidate sets
- the candidate-set control
- budget and ablation studies
- noise robustness tests
- probes of beneficial soft work
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Limits
- Simulations only. All results come from mechanistic simulations, and the authors say live-model validation is still needed. The 500-token overhead figure is synthetic.
- Action amplitude is not measured. The "action amplitude" signature behind the Parkinsonism metaphor is illustrative only and is not a validated endpoint.
- Constraints are not exercised. LPB v0.2 does not exercise a general-purpose constraint predicate engine, so the constraint set C is untested.
- Token efficiency is not independent evidence. When all compared trajectories succeed, the token-efficiency metric is just 1000/T_total and duplicates the token-cost result.
- Text is truncated. The fetched text stops in the metrics section, so the ablation and noise-robustness results are not visible here.
Technologies named here
- Global Executive Control v0.2
Techniques named here
- LLM Parkinsonism
- Global Executive Control
- Candidate-set local control
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