
Fault-tolerant foundation models
This arXiv paper shows that large language models can be trained to tolerate unreliable, faulty digital hardware, and that their error resilience improves rather than degrades as model size increases. Using modified neural scaling laws derived from 40,000 GPU-hours of training runs on simulated faulty hardware, the authors argue that LLMs learn to compute within "good" error-correcting codes whose relative overhead stays finite regardless of scale, suggesting a path toward running AI inference on low-energy, unreliable hardware for substantial energy savings.
What it claims
Llama2-style transformers trained under the same random hardware faults they will see at inference ("fault-hardened") follow a modified scaling law. That law has an extra curvature term, α₂. Because of it, the fraction of the model doing useful work first falls with size and then recovers past a critical size N. Models trained clean and then run on faulty hardware ("fault-blind") have no well-defined scaling at all: past a fault-rate threshold, more training data makes them worse*. The authors read the recovery as evidence that models learn "good" error-correcting codes rather than repetition. Formal fault tolerance (finite capacity as N→∞ below a threshold fault rate p_th) is stated as a conjecture, not shown.
How it works
- Fault model. On every forward pass, in both training and inference, random blocks of k=4 matrix elements inside the attention and feed-forward matrix products are zeroed with probability p. Faults are resampled per query, so the model cannot calibrate to one fixed device defect.
- Capacity metric. η is the size of a fault-blind model, run on clean hardware, that matches the loss of a fault-hardened model of size N at fault rate p. The ratio η/N works like a code rate.
- Scaling law. L = E(p) + exp(α₀ − α₁n − α₂n²) + exp(β₀ − β₁d), with n = ln(N/N₀) and d = ln(D/D₀). N₀ and D₀ are both set to 4×10⁷, and the irreducible loss E is fixed at about 1.5. Standard laws have α₂ = 0. Here α₂ grows with p, which makes ln(η/N) a parabola in ln N with its minimum at N* = N₀·exp(c₁/2c₂).
- Logit diagnostics. The KL divergence between clean and faulted outputs is split into two parts:
- a temperature shift, which rescaling the logits can fix;
- an irreducible "scrambling" term, which it cannot.
Evidence
- Compute and data. About 40,000 GPU-hours, spent on thousands of models trained on a slice of FineWeb across a sweep of N, D and p. The largest models are N ≈ 10⁹.
- How α₁ and α₂ move with p. At small p, drops in α₁ are offset by rises in α₂. At large p, α₂ plateaus while α₁ keeps falling. The authors read this as a sign of a fault-tolerance threshold.
- Training cost. β₁ falls as p rises, so fault-hardened models need more tokens to match a fault-free model's data budget. The size of this overhead grows with p (Eq. 6, Fig. 2c), partly by extrapolation.
- Fault-blind collapse (Fig. 3a). With faults on at evaluation, loss can increase with D. The D at which gains stop appears to fall as p_eval rises. Standard errors come from 8 independently trained models per D.
- Temperature. Fault-blind models' output temperature rises quickly with p_eval, and more so at larger D. Fault-hardened models hold a constant temperature until p_eval exceeds p_train.
- Scrambling. Fault-hardened models lose almost no capacity to the irreducible scrambling term while p_eval < p_train, independent of D. Fault-blind models degrade from p_eval > 0. Logit rescaling alone therefore cannot rescue a clean-trained model.
- Robustness of the trend. The authors say the capacity-recovery trend shows up in the processed raw data without the fitted law (Supplementary Information Sec. A).
Limits
- Simulated faults only. Results come from emulated block-zeroing faults, not real hardware. The page describes no physical device test. Other fault types are not shown, such as arbitrary-magnitude errors or analog noise, even though the intro names those as the realistic case.
- Asymptote not resolved. The term A that governs behaviour as N→∞ is indistinguishable from 0 at the tested scales, and L_N/E never dropped below about 0.5. Whether capacity plateaus at a nonzero constant at commercial scale is untested. The Fig. 1 extrapolations depend on unmeasured assumptions.
- Fixed constants. E was fixed by hand because it could not be identified from the data. The authors say this does not change the qualitative results. k was fixed at 4 throughout.
- Matched fault rates. Hardening assumes p_train = p_eval. Protection holds only up to p_train.
- Evaluation scope. Only held-out loss on web text is reported. There are no downstream task benchmarks.
- No release or energy numbers. No energy-savings figures, code, weights or licence appear in the fetched text.
- Truncated page. The fetched text cuts off before the hardware architecture section and Methods.
Techniques named here
- Fault-tolerant training of LLMs
- Modified neural scaling laws for faulty hardware
- Computing within error-correcting codes
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