keyv and cacheable npm Package Hijacked in Supply Chain Attack

What it is

The Wiz page on the keyv/cacheable npm compromise carries concrete IOCs and detection artifacts the summary abstracts away. The attack began at 09:00 UTC (page dated August 4, 2026); the worm reached 400+ packages. The payload is a modified "Mini" Shai-Hulud variant.

Indicators the summary omits

• C2 domain: the StringListStore contract initially returned three domains, then was updated to return only npm-cache[.]com. The contract owner was funded by an address previously flagged for scam activity.
• Malicious user-agent: Bun/1.3.13 performing the malicious calls.
• Lock file artifact: tmp.dpkg_14527.lock.
• GitHub exfil repos use the default description Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again.
• Commit fingerprints: the intimidation string IfYouBlockThisAPIKeyItWillCrashTheLiveProductionServersOfAllThirdPartyClients in initial commits; IDE-persistence commits use the message chore: update config.

How the new features work

• Dead-man's switch is now selectively armed by C2 response: the C2 returns a code specifying the command to arm the switch and which token to monitor for revocation. The revocation monitor checks api.github.com/user, so any token valid there can be watched.
• Per-machine targeting: the malware sends a SHA256 hash of concatenated system properties alongside stolen credentials — Wiz believes this enables customized (targeted) dead-man switch delivery.
• A new RSA key encrypts exfiltrated data, but the RSA key verifying fallback C2s posted to GitHub is unchanged.

Expanded credential targets (~70% more)

New additions: AI-agent credential stores for Claude, OpenAI, Codex, Cursor, Gemini; crypto keystores for Foundry, Solana, Monero; self-hosted CI/registry secrets — Jenkins master.key, Argo CD, Harbor; Alibaba Cloud and Tencent Cloud CLI configs; and system files including /etc/shadow.

What to do

Per Wiz: identify and remove affected package versions from dev/build/CI; treat affected systems as compromised and rebuild if malicious packages were installed; rotate exposed credentials (cloud, GitHub tokens, SSH keys, Kubernetes configs, Terraform creds); review cloud/source environments for unauthorized access post-install; monitor for the IOCs above; and enable dependency allowlisting, package integrity verification, and provenance controls. The full affected-package list is on Wiz's GitHub.

Caveats

The page is explicitly an initial, actively-updated investigation — affected packages, IOCs, and attribution may change.