aikido.devarticleWhat MDM can't protect on developer machines (and what to do about it)
Aikido Security argues that MDM (Jamf, Kandji, Intune) and EDR (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne) operate at the OS/application layer and are blind to the modern developer attack surface: npm/pip package installs with postinstall hooks, VS Code/IDE extensions, browser extensions, and MCP servers used by AI coding tools. It walks through the Nx Console extension compromise that exposed 3,800 GitHub repos, the Cyberhaven and Vercel/Context.ai OAuth-token browser-extension chain, the Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm, and the postmark-mcp malicious MCP server as evidence, then recommends a 48-hour minimum package age, disabling postinstall scripts by default, auditing extensions, and monitoring AI tool installs (pitching Aikido Device Protection/Safe Chain as the fix).
Organisations named here
- Cyberhaven
- slopsquatting
Technologies named here
- VS Code
- Jamf
- Kandji
- GitHub
- Microsoft Intune
- npm packages
- CrowdStrike
- Vercel internal systems
- SentinelOne
- Google Workspace
- Chrome extension
- Aikido Device Protection
- npm axios package
- Aikido Safe Chain
- postmark-mcp npm package
- Aikido Intel
- npm
- Model Context Protocol
- Aikido Security
- Chrome
- Nx Console
- axios
- postmark-mcp
- Vercel
Techniques named here
- Malicious IDE extension supply chain compromise
- Postinstall hook credential theft
- Slopsquatting
- Malicious browser extension with OAuth token abuse
- Silent auto-update to malicious version
- Malicious MCP server backdoor
Threat actors named here
- Mini Shai-Hulud
- Malicious VS Code extension attacker
- Vercel breach attacker
- Cyberhaven breach
- postmark-mcp backdoor
- TeamPCP attack
- Axios attack
Related in Supply Chain
