
Non-profiled Single-Trace ML-DSA Secret Key Recovery by Horizontal Distribution Analysis
Non-profiled single-trace side-channel attack on ML-DSA-65 (Dilithium) running on ARM Cortex-M4, by Linus Backlund and Elena Dubrova (KTH). It compares observed sample distributions with expected Hamming weight leakage using a Gaussian mixture model, and stacks partitioned trace segments for multiple observations. Information-set decoding corrects misclassifications; with a 2^70 enumeration budget, the full secret key is recovered from one trace in 99% of attacks, using secret key unpacking as the attack point.
TL;DR Shows single-trace secret key recovery on ML-DSA-65 on Cortex-M4 without profiling or a clone device, using a Gaussian mixture model and information-set decoding.
Organisations named here
- Dilithium
- Elena Dubrova
- Hamming weight leakage
- horizontal attack
- information-set decoding
- Linus Backlund
- non-profiled attack
Technologies named here
- Gaussian mixture model
- Information-set decoding algorithms
- ML-DSA, post-quantum signature scheme
- ML-DSA
- Arm Cortex-M4
Techniques named here
- Horizontal distribution analysis
Related in Hardware & RF

HAETAE on a Diet: Less Stack, Less Time on Low-End Microcontrollers
geo-tp/ESP32-Bit-Pirate
