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Modeling Modular Multiplication for Monomial Prediction and Impossible Differentials, with Application to MSX
eprint.iacr.orgpaper

Modeling Modular Multiplication for Monomial Prediction and Impossible Differentials, with Application to MSX

This ePrint paper gives the first exact bit-level models of modular multiplication z=(x·y) mod 2^n. One model is for monomial prediction under 3SDP-woU, the other for impossible differential search. Applied to the MSX lightweight cipher, it yields a 7-round integral distinguisher (2^96 data) for MSX-128, key recoveries on 8 and 9 of 18 rounds at about 2^228 operations, and 1,984 seven-round impossible differentials. Both models are implemented in CLAASP.

TL;DR Presents exact monomial-prediction and impossible-differential models for modular multiplication and uses them for the first independent cryptanalysis of MSX.
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What it is

A preprint by Emanuele Bellini, Mohamed Rachidi and Sharwan K. Tiwari (ePrint 2026/2586, approved 24 October 2026). It gives the first independent cryptanalysis of MSX, a lightweight block cipher family for microcontrollers. MSX uses modular addition and modular multiplication on 32-bit words. Its designers prove ideal strong differential and linear properties because the multiplication makes the round function a strongly universal hash. They did so with bounds and estimates, with no explicit trail.

How it works

The authors build two bit-level models of z = (x·y) mod 2^n.

  • Monomial prediction under 3SDP-woU. The model assigns an exact parity to every monomial without a truth table.
  • Impossible differentials. This is a deterministic truncated model for miss-in-the-middle search. The authors prove it is exact for two independent operands, so every incompatibility reported through a multiplication is genuine.

Both models are implemented in the CLAASP library and can be used on any included primitive that uses modular multiplication.

Results on MSX

  • MSX-128 integral distinguisher: 7 rounds, data complexity 2^96. A 96-bit cube leaves 64 of the 128 output bits balanced.
  • Key recovery: 8 and 9 of 18 rounds, recovering the 256-bit master key in about 2^228 operations. The authors say this improves on the designers' generic yoyo key recovery on seven rounds.
  • Impossible differentials: a search over all 16,384 single-bit input/output pairs at each round count found 1,984 at seven rounds and none at eight.

Caveats

  • Cost is about 2^228 against a 256-bit key, and the attacks reach at most 9 of 18 rounds. The abstract gives no sign that the full cipher is threatened.
  • The exactness proof covers independent operands only. The abstract does not say what happens when the multiplication operands are correlated.
  • The impossible-differential search covered single-bit pairs only, so the "none at eight rounds" result does not rule out other differentials.
  • The page is an unrefereed preprint, and the abstract does not give the 8-round and 9-round complexities separately.

Organisations named here

  • Emanuele Bellini
  • impossible differential
  • integral distinguisher
  • miss-in-the-middle
  • three-subset division property
  • yoyo attack

Technologies named here

  • CLAASP library
  • MSX-128
  • CLAASP
  • MSX

Techniques named here

  • Monomial prediction