
Modeling Modular Multiplication for Monomial Prediction and Impossible Differentials, with Application to MSX
This ePrint paper gives the first exact bit-level models of modular multiplication z=(x·y) mod 2^n. One model is for monomial prediction under 3SDP-woU, the other for impossible differential search. Applied to the MSX lightweight cipher, it yields a 7-round integral distinguisher (2^96 data) for MSX-128, key recoveries on 8 and 9 of 18 rounds at about 2^228 operations, and 1,984 seven-round impossible differentials. Both models are implemented in CLAASP.
What it is
A preprint by Emanuele Bellini, Mohamed Rachidi and Sharwan K. Tiwari (ePrint 2026/2586, approved 24 October 2026). It gives the first independent cryptanalysis of MSX, a lightweight block cipher family for microcontrollers. MSX uses modular addition and modular multiplication on 32-bit words. Its designers prove ideal strong differential and linear properties because the multiplication makes the round function a strongly universal hash. They did so with bounds and estimates, with no explicit trail.
How it works
The authors build two bit-level models of z = (x·y) mod 2^n.
- Monomial prediction under 3SDP-woU. The model assigns an exact parity to every monomial without a truth table.
- Impossible differentials. This is a deterministic truncated model for miss-in-the-middle search. The authors prove it is exact for two independent operands, so every incompatibility reported through a multiplication is genuine.
Both models are implemented in the CLAASP library and can be used on any included primitive that uses modular multiplication.
Results on MSX
- MSX-128 integral distinguisher: 7 rounds, data complexity 2^96. A 96-bit cube leaves 64 of the 128 output bits balanced.
- Key recovery: 8 and 9 of 18 rounds, recovering the 256-bit master key in about 2^228 operations. The authors say this improves on the designers' generic yoyo key recovery on seven rounds.
- Impossible differentials: a search over all 16,384 single-bit input/output pairs at each round count found 1,984 at seven rounds and none at eight.
Caveats
- Cost is about 2^228 against a 256-bit key, and the attacks reach at most 9 of 18 rounds. The abstract gives no sign that the full cipher is threatened.
- The exactness proof covers independent operands only. The abstract does not say what happens when the multiplication operands are correlated.
- The impossible-differential search covered single-bit pairs only, so the "none at eight rounds" result does not rule out other differentials.
- The page is an unrefereed preprint, and the abstract does not give the 8-round and 9-round complexities separately.
Organisations named here
- Emanuele Bellini
- impossible differential
- integral distinguisher
- miss-in-the-middle
- three-subset division property
- yoyo attack
Technologies named here
- CLAASP library
- MSX-128
- CLAASP
- MSX
Techniques named here
- Monomial prediction
Related in other

Rerandomizable Garbling for Arithmetic Circuits

