eprint.iacr.orgpaperDPA-style Attacks on VOLE-in-the-Head Signature Schemes
Presents the first DPA-style power side-channel attack framework against VOLE-in-the-Head signature schemes, targeting the secret witness whose recovery enables forging signatures on arbitrary messages. It analyzes leakage from sensitive intermediate values in VOLE correlations and proposes six attack classes (two vertical, four horizontal) on FAEST and SDitH, both in NIST's third round of additional signatures. Attacks are validated with simulated leakage under varying noise and real measurements on three ARM Cortex-M4 devices.
TL;DR First DPA attack framework on VOLEitH PQC signatures (FAEST, SDitH): six attacks recovering the secret witness, validated on Cortex-M4 devices.
Organisations named here
- differential power analysis
- VOLE-in-the-Head
Technologies named here
- FAEST
- SDitH
- ARM Cortex-M4 devices
- Arm Cortex-M4
- NIST
Techniques named here
- Linking leakage to secret witness hypotheses
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