Skip to content

Back to the catalog

OFAC and DOJ Strike Xinbi, a Multibillion-Dollar Marketplace for Cybercriminals
chainalysis.comarticle

OFAC and DOJ Strike Xinbi, a Multibillion-Dollar Marketplace for Cybercriminals

Chainalysis details the OFAC/DOJ sanctioning and seizure action against Xinbi Guarantee, a $24B Chinese-language Telegram-based marketplace connecting money laundering, scam infrastructure, stolen data, and KYC-bypass vendors. The piece maps Xinbi's escrow model and vendor ecosystem, and traces how DPRK-linked actors used specialized 'Black U' launderers to swap traceable stolen funds from the Bybit ($1.5B) and WazirX ($235M) hacks for cleaner stablecoins sourced from pig-butchering and romance-scam proceeds, ultimately leading to $52M in restrained cryptocurrency across 49 wallets.

TL;DR Chainalysis breaks down the Xinbi Guarantee takedown — a $24B Telegram-based crypto crime marketplace where DPRK hackers laundered Bybit/WazirX theft proceeds via 'Black U' stablecoin-swap laundering, resulting in $52M seized/restrained.
Document

What it is

Chainalysis's writeup of the September 9, 2026 OFAC designation of Xinbi Guarantee, adding detail the summary omits: OFAC also sanctioned SafeW Technology and Anwen Technology — developers of the messaging and crypto-payment apps underpinning Xinbi's operations — not just the marketplace itself. This is a coordinated OFAC/DOJ/UK action, not a single agency move.

Key specifics beyond the summary

  • 52 OFAC-designated addresses collectively received over $8.4 billion in stablecoins — a compliance-relevant figure distinct from the $52M restrained. Any exposure to these addresses is now sanctions exposure.
  • DOJ Scam Center Strike Force (SCSF) — named actor — seized two Xinbi payment-collection wallets holding ~$12M (Sept 7 court-authorized warrant, which also seized the Telegram channels) and restrained 47 additional associated wallets. That is the 2 + 47 = 49 wallets / $52M breakdown.
  • UK FCDO first sanctioned Xinbi in March 2026 under its Global Human Rights regime (tied to trafficking/forced-labor scam compounds), and updated its designation alongside OFAC's to add dozens more addresses. Screening lists should reflect both jurisdictions.
  • Tether actively assisted law enforcement — relevant because the tainted assets are stablecoins subject to issuer freeze capability.

Context worth carrying

The page frames Xinbi within a structural shift: Chinese-language laundering services now process an estimated 20% of all illicit crypto over five years, including $16B in 2025. Xinbi is one "guarantee platform" in that ecosystem — the designation dents but does not remove the category.

What to do

  • Add the 52 OFAC addresses and the FCDO-added addresses to sanctions/transaction-screening blocklists; both lists were expanded in this coordinated action.
  • Treat any historical counterparty exposure to those addresses as potential OFAC exposure given the $8.4B throughput.
  • The "Black U" substitution laundering means DPRK-origin funds (Bybit/WazirX) were swapped into nominally clean stablecoins from scam proceeds — so downstream "clean" stablecoin flows from this network still carry sanctions and DPRK-nexus risk despite lacking a direct hack trace.

Caveats

The page states 47 of the 49 wallets are "restrained" and "believed to be associated" — restraint is not forfeiture, and association is asserted by authorities, not proven on-chain in the text. Chainalysis's own disclaimer declines to warrant accuracy or completeness.

Organisations named here

  • Black U
  • WazirX

Technologies named here

  • Telegram
  • Bybit

Techniques named here

  • Escrow-based marketplace trust model
  • Crypto laundering via stablecoin substitution
  • KYC bypass services

Threat actors named here

  • Xinbi Guarantee
  • DPRK-linked actors
  • "Black U" launderers
  • SafeW Technology
  • Anwen Technology
  • DPRK