
Associated-Data Correlations in Eevee: Deterministic Forgeries against Nonce-Misuse Security
Cryptanalysis of the Eevee forkcipher-based AEAD modes Umbreon and Espeon, which claim online AE security under nonce reuse. Associated-data correlations give probability-one non-empty-message forgeries with three encryption queries and one verification query. The paper adds an affine treatment of partial final blocks (n-r+3 queries, or n-r+2 with adaptive choices). It also checks the published Umbreon attack with the official ForkSkinny primitive and reports a two-query attack accepted by the unmodified public C modes.
What it is
Isobe and Rahman's ePrint 2026/2518 is a cryptanalysis of the Eevee forkcipher AEAD modes Umbreon and Espeon. Both claim online AE security under nonce reuse. The attacks are deterministic: probability-one forgeries on non-empty messages.
How it works
- Two AD-only tags reveal a mask difference.
- That difference lets an attacker translate a known ciphertext from one AD value to another, so the ciphertext verifies under the new AD.
- The basic attack needs three encryption queries and one verification query.
- Partial final blocks are handled with an affine construction. For a fixed final-fragment length r, it takes n-r+3 encryption queries.
- If the forged length may be r or r-h (chosen 1 ≤ h < r < n) and the source plaintext is chosen adaptively, it takes n-r+2.
- Both constructions satisfy the padding check.
- They work for general message lengths. Espeon additionally needs at least one preceding complete block.
Preconditions / Affected
- The target is Umbreon or Espeon deployed with nonce reuse, which is the setting where they claim security. The attacker needs encryption queries and one verification attempt.
- The paper also analyzes a published short-message Espeon AD omission.
What to do
- Treat the nonce-misuse (online AE) claims for Umbreon and Espeon as broken. Don't rely on them where nonce reuse is possible.
- The paper gives no fix. Adding finalization is discussed only as an unproved countermeasure direction.
- To reproduce, the authors report a two-query attack accepted by the unmodified public C modes. They also validated the published complete-block Umbreon attack using the official ForkSkinny primitive in a specification adapter.
Caveats
- The basic attacks and their proof diagnosis overlap with independent, concurrent work by Mao et al. The authors' own contribution is the partial-block treatment.
- The page is an abstract only. It gives no concrete parameters, test vectors or code location.
- The page doesn't say whether the Eevee designers have responded.
- It is a preprint and has not been peer reviewed.
Organisations named here
- Espeon
- nonce misuse
- Umbreon
Technologies named here
- Eevee Umbreon mode
- Eevee Espeon mode
- Unmodified public C implementation of Eevee modes
- C
- Eevee
- ForkSkinny
Techniques named here
- Associated-data correlation attack
- Affine treatment of partial final message blocks
- Analysis of the published short-message Espeon AD omission
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