
Post-Quantum Command Authentication for Unmanned Systems: A KpqC Feasibility Study under Real-Time and Bandwidth Constraints
This paper evaluates whether Korean post-quantum crypto candidates (HAETAE, AIMer, SMAUG-T, NTRU+) and NIST PQC standards (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) can replace classical ECDSA/ECDH in the authentication and key-establishment path of ROS2/DDS-Security for UAV/UGV command channels. The authors build a feasibility envelope mapping each algorithm's key/signature size and handshake latency against real command-link constraints (message rate, MTU, latency deadline, bandwidth), then validate it with authentication-handshake measurements over emulated constrained links on a two-node testbed, producing a classical→NIST→KpqC comparison and per-channel-budget application guidance.
Organisations named here
- KpqC
- ML-DSA
- ML-KEM
- SLH-DSA
Technologies named here
- HAETAE
- ROS2/DDS-Security
- AIMer
- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
- SMAUG-T
- Unmanned Ground Vehicles
- NTRU+
- ML-KEM
- ML-DSA
- SLH-DSA
- ECDSA
- ECDH
- DDS-Security
- ROS2
Techniques named here
- Post-quantum command authentication feasibility analysis
- Classical→NIST→KpqC three-way comparison
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