
Socket: 152 Chrome Live Wallpaper Extensions Hid Ad Tracking and Faked Google Search Traffic
Socket's Threat Research Team uncovered a family of 152 Chrome 'live wallpaper' new-tab extensions, built from one shared codebase and spread across 38 publisher accounts and three brand backends (tabplugins.com, yowgames.com, chromewallpaper.com), with ~105,000 combined installs. A 54-listing subset forges Google organic-search attribution via fake utm_source=google tags and a cloaked google.com/url uninstall redirect carrying spoofed ved/usg tokens, while every listing falsely claims 'no data collected' on the Chrome Web Store despite its own linked privacy policy admitting IP/ISP/click logging shared with AdSense, DoubleClick, and ad partners. All 141 verified samples also ship an undisclosed, inert IndexedDB enumerate-and-delete anti-forensic routine on every service-worker start.
What it is
A family of 152 Chrome Web Store new-tab "live wallpaper" extensions (Socket Threat Research, by Kush Pandya), built from one shared codebase, spread across 38 publisher accounts and three brand backends (tabplugins-brand being the newer template), ~105,000 installs. Classed as adware-adjacent PUP. The harm is deceptive traffic measurement, undisclosed telemetry, and a provably false "no data collected" store disclosure that the linked privacy policy contradicts.
How it works
The service worker js/bg.js hardcodes two URLs and fires them on lifecycle events:
- Install (
chrome.runtime.onInstalled): force-opens atabplugins[.]comtab taggedutm_source=google&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=..., stamping self-generated traffic as Google organic search. It also opensnewtab.html. - Uninstall (
chrome.runtime.setUninstallURL): fires ahttps://www.google.com/url?...wrapper containing signedvedandusgtokens — the same format Google uses for real search-result redirects — so atabplugins[.]comdestination looks like a human clicking a Google result. This both phones home the uninstall and launders the referral.
The point is funnel monetization, not injection: forced, falsely-attributed traffic feeds ad-monetized brand pages while the user is logged, and the identical template across dozens of accounts means no single takedown dents the network.
Separately, 100% of the family ships an IndexedDB enumerate-and-delete routine that runs on every service-worker start — anti-forensic in design but inert in this build; it deletes nothing.
What to do
The page gives no patch or command — actions are detection/hunting:
- Flag extensions whose install fires a
chrome.tabs.createto an external domain taggedutm_source=google&utm_medium=organic. - Flag
setUninstallURLvalues wrapping agoogle.com/urlredirect withved/usgtokens pointing to a non-Google destination. - Treat inbound "organic" traffic carrying these hardcoded campaign params as fabricated; discount it in analytics/ad-attribution.
- Domain IOC:
tabplugins[.]com.
Caveats
The article text cuts off mid-section on the IndexedDB code. The wipe routine is confirmed inert in the analyzed build — a future update could arm it. Only the 54-listing tabplugins-brand subset performs the traffic-laundering; all 152 share the false disclosure and dormant wipe.
Organisations named here
- Advergic
- chromewallpaper.com
- owhit.com
- T1070
- T1176.001
- T1583.001
- tabplugins.com
- yowgames.com
Technologies named here
- Socket's Chrome extension protection
- Google Chrome Web Store extensions
- Wayback Machine
- node --check
- Chrome Web Store
- Chrome
- Cloudflare
- WordPress
Techniques named here
- Browser Extensions
- Masquerading
- Indicator Removal
- Application Layer Protocol
- Acquire Infrastructure
Threat actors named here
- 152 Chrome Live Wallpaper Extensions family
Also named here
- T1036
- T1071.001
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