kaandemir993/DarkTortilla-RAT-Telegram-Exfiltration-Payload-Extraction-Analysis
A hands-on reverse-engineering writeup dissecting a DarkTortilla RAT sample (pulled from MalwareBazaar) using Process Hacker, Binary Ninja and x64dbg. It documents the malware's credit-card theft (card_number_encrypted strings for Visa, Mastercard, Amex, Diners Club, etc.), browser credential theft via SQLite queries against Login Data files and app_bound_encrypted_key/os_crypt decryption, and three parallel exfiltration channels — a Telegram bot, SMTP mail, and FTP upload — with the C2 domain showip.net used for IP detection.
What it is
A reverse-engineering writeup of a DarkTortilla RAT sample (from MalwareBazaar) that, beyond the theft capabilities the summary lists, hands the reader a set of concrete host- and network-level indicators and detection ideas. The value here is the IOCs and detection guidance the summary does not carry.
Indicators the summary omits
- Local staging file:
C:\Users\Public\strEncodedData.txtholds stolen credentials before exfiltration — a concrete artifact to hunt for on disk. - SMTP exfil host:
mail.mfcgroups.com, used withCDO.Message,smtpserver,sendusername,sendpassword. - Telegram exfil:
https://api.telegram.org/botwith placeholder config tokens@StrBotTokenand@ChatID; FTP uses@GateUrland@StrFtpUser. - Script/macro fingerprints: VBA functions
__vbaResume,__vbaAryVar,__vbaPutOwner4, plus VBScript markersOption Explicit/On Error Resume Next— indicating macro-borne delivery and script-based execution. - Email harvesting regex:
[A-Z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z]{2,6}.
What to do
The page states these defensive actions directly:
- Block C2 / exfil domains:
showip.netandapi.telegram.org(the latter only where its use is abusive). - Monitor for embedded Telegram bot config strings (
@StrBotToken,@ChatID). - Detect SQLite API usage (
sqlite3_open,sqlite3_prepare_v2) inside suspicious processes — the malware queries browserLogin Datafiles this way. - Alert on access to Chrome/Edge key material
app_bound_encrypted_keyandos_crypt, which the RAT uses to decrypt saved passwords. - Hunt for the staging file
C:\Users\Public\strEncodedData.txt.
Caveats
This is one analyst's static/dynamic walkthrough (Process Hacker, Binary Ninja, x64dbg) of a single sample, not a vendor report. Config values like the Telegram token and @GateUrl appear as template placeholders, so per-campaign values will differ; the durable indicators are the file path, SMTP host, API-string patterns, and behavioral detections above rather than any one credential.
Technologies named here
- Process Hacker
- Google Chrome browser
- Binary Ninja
- Microsoft Edge browser
- x64dbg
- Mozilla Firefox browser
- MalwareBazaar
- Brave browser
- Opera browser
- Avast Browser
- Visa card data
- Mastercard card data
- Discover Card data
- Union Pay Card data
- American Express card data
- Carte Blanche Card data
- Diners Club Card data
- SQLite
- Telegram
- Windows
Techniques named here
- Credit card data theft
- Browser credential/cookie/history theft
- Browser encryption key abuse
- SQLite database querying
- Email address extraction via regex
- VBA/macro-based delivery
- VBScript persistence/execution
- C2 communication / IP detection
- Multi-channel exfiltration
- Local data staging
Threat actors named here
- DarkTortilla RAT
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