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kaandemir993/DarkTortilla-RAT-Telegram-Exfiltration-Payload-Extraction-Analysis
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kaandemir993/DarkTortilla-RAT-Telegram-Exfiltration-Payload-Extraction-Analysis

A hands-on reverse-engineering writeup dissecting a DarkTortilla RAT sample (pulled from MalwareBazaar) using Process Hacker, Binary Ninja and x64dbg. It documents the malware's credit-card theft (card_number_encrypted strings for Visa, Mastercard, Amex, Diners Club, etc.), browser credential theft via SQLite queries against Login Data files and app_bound_encrypted_key/os_crypt decryption, and three parallel exfiltration channels — a Telegram bot, SMTP mail, and FTP upload — with the C2 domain showip.net used for IP detection.

TL;DR Static/dynamic RE walkthrough of DarkTortilla RAT showing its credit-card/browser-credential theft and Telegram+SMTP+FTP exfiltration, with IOCs and a MalwareBazaar sample link.
Document

What it is

A reverse-engineering writeup of a DarkTortilla RAT sample (from MalwareBazaar) that, beyond the theft capabilities the summary lists, hands the reader a set of concrete host- and network-level indicators and detection ideas. The value here is the IOCs and detection guidance the summary does not carry.

Indicators the summary omits

  • Local staging file: C:\Users\Public\strEncodedData.txt holds stolen credentials before exfiltration — a concrete artifact to hunt for on disk.
  • SMTP exfil host: mail.mfcgroups.com, used with CDO.Message, smtpserver, sendusername, sendpassword.
  • Telegram exfil: https://api.telegram.org/bot with placeholder config tokens @StrBotToken and @ChatID; FTP uses @GateUrl and @StrFtpUser.
  • Script/macro fingerprints: VBA functions __vbaResume, __vbaAryVar, __vbaPutOwner4, plus VBScript markers Option Explicit / On Error Resume Next — indicating macro-borne delivery and script-based execution.
  • Email harvesting regex: [A-Z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z]{2,6}.

What to do

The page states these defensive actions directly:

  • Block C2 / exfil domains: showip.net and api.telegram.org (the latter only where its use is abusive).
  • Monitor for embedded Telegram bot config strings (@StrBotToken, @ChatID).
  • Detect SQLite API usage (sqlite3_open, sqlite3_prepare_v2) inside suspicious processes — the malware queries browser Login Data files this way.
  • Alert on access to Chrome/Edge key material app_bound_encrypted_key and os_crypt, which the RAT uses to decrypt saved passwords.
  • Hunt for the staging file C:\Users\Public\strEncodedData.txt.

Caveats

This is one analyst's static/dynamic walkthrough (Process Hacker, Binary Ninja, x64dbg) of a single sample, not a vendor report. Config values like the Telegram token and @GateUrl appear as template placeholders, so per-campaign values will differ; the durable indicators are the file path, SMTP host, API-string patterns, and behavioral detections above rather than any one credential.

Technologies named here

Techniques named here

  • Credit card data theft
  • Browser credential/cookie/history theft
  • Browser encryption key abuse
  • SQLite database querying
  • Email address extraction via regex
  • VBA/macro-based delivery
  • VBScript persistence/execution
  • C2 communication / IP detection
  • Multi-channel exfiltration
  • Local data staging

Threat actors named here

  • DarkTortilla RAT