
Derek Abdine (@dabdine) on X
An X/Twitter thread arguing that vulnerability remediation is not a single process but a multi-branch decision tree: patchable issues suffer from patch-management tools misreporting status or breaking systems; unpatched 0days (e.g. Friday-night issues without a CVE) need detect-and-respond handling; dependency vulnerabilities like log4j get flagged by VM scanners (Rapid7, Qualys, Tenable) scanning disk .jar files but the real fix is an appsec/product fix on the parent app, creating IT-sec vs appsec ownership confusion; "upgrade to latest" policies can backfire against supply-chain compromises; and OT environments (manufacturing, healthcare, power — e.g. Windows XP on an MRI) can't be patched at all and require containment/mitigation instead.
Techniques named here
- Detect-and-respond remediation workflow
- Containment / mitigation
- Disk scanning for dependency files
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