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The Rise of LLMJacking: How Threat Actors Monetize Compromised Cloud and Model Resources
cloud.google.comarticle

The Rise of LLMJacking: How Threat Actors Monetize Compromised Cloud and Model Resources

LLMJacking is the hijacking of enterprise cloud LLM access, which Mandiant and GTIG saw in multiple 2026 incidents with charges above $100,000 a day and up to $1 million per victim. The report covers initial access through stolen cloud tokens and API keys, persistence, LiteLLM privilege escalation (CVE-2026-40217), and resale through "LLM Mixers" such as Jet Night and newapi[.]pro. It gives CloudTrail, Azure and GCP audit-log hunting guidance and hardening steps.

TL;DR Mandiant and GTIG describe how actors steal cloud credentials to hijack enterprise LLM access and resell it, with detection and hardening advice for AWS, Azure and GCP.
Document

What it is

A Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) report on LLMJacking incidents in 2026. Attackers use stolen cloud or LLM credentials to run and resell model inference on the victim's bill. The page's most usable content is the per-cloud audit-log operations to alert on, plus a few attacker behaviours that defeat common volume alerts.

How it works

The dominant entry vector was exposed or stolen cloud identity tokens (IAM credentials, service account keys, GitHub PATs, session tokens), not exposed LLM endpoints. Some specifics:

  • A federation-token actor generated fresh access keys programmatically to get around MFA.
  • UNC6993 ran a fake application portal that asked users to paste a raw JSON session token, which was posted to a backend to bypass password and MFA.
  • One actor harvested LLM keys from public GitHub repositories and validated them with max_tokens=1 requests, which stayed under EDR and SIEM volume alerts.
  • To get around rate limits, one actor ran a "burn and rotate" loop of creating and deleting short-lived service accounts.
  • A LiteLLM gateway was attacked after Virtual Keys were obtained. A user ID rebind flaw in /key/regenerate (CVE-2026-40217) raised ordinary Virtual Keys to PROXY_ADMIN.
  • Persistence used backdoor IAM or service accounts (one disguised as a billing optimization tool) and SSH keys injected into instance metadata.

In several incidents LLM services were not enabled at compromise time. The attacker used stolen keys to enable Bedrock or the Gemini API, then ran up large bills within minutes or hours.

What to do

Treat any unauthorized enablement of an LLM service as a critical event. Operations the page lists:

AWS (CloudTrail, bedrock.amazonaws.com)

  • Use: Converse, InvokeModel, InvokeModelWithResponseStream.
  • Error spikes: ThrottlingException, ValidationException, ResourceNotFoundException.
  • Recon: ListFoundationModels, ListInferenceProfiles, GetFoundationModelAvailability.
  • Model unlock: PutUseCaseForModelAccess, CreateFoundationModelAgreement.
  • Logging tampering: GetModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration, PutModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration, DeleteModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration. Disabling by non-IaC principals is high severity.
  • User-agents worth reviewing: claude-cli, aws-sdk-rust, aws-sdk-go-v2.

Azure (Microsoft.CognitiveServices)

  • Management plane: accounts/deployments/write, plus accounts/read and accounts/deployments/read for recon.
  • Inference is data plane only, so Diagnostic Logs must be on to see Completions or Chat Completions POST volume.
  • Logging tampering: Microsoft.Insights/diagnosticSettings/read, write, delete.

GCP (aiplatform.googleapis.com)

  • Alert on google.api.serviceusage.v1.ServiceUsage.EnableService.
  • Inference: PredictionService.Predict, GenerateContent, StreamGenerateContent. These sit in Data Access logs, which are off by default and must be enabled.
  • Recon: ModelService.ListModels, EndpointService.ListEndpoints, PublisherModelService.ListPublisherModels.
  • Evasion checks: GetIamPolicy, ConfigServiceV2.ListSinks, GetSink.

Controls

  • Alert on low-volume max_tokens=1 or zero-temperature pings at the gateway.
  • Set per-model API quotas and spending caps.
  • Scope API keys by model, environment and usage limit.
  • Deny LLM service access to identities that do not need it.
  • Patch LiteLLM and other routing gateways for CVE-2026-40217.
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA and run secret scanning on repositories.

Google SecOps rules named as covering this activity include AWS Create New Access Key, GCP Service Account Key Creation, GCE Project SSH Keys, and Persistence: Compute Set Instance or Project Metadata Startup Scripts or URLs.

Caveats

The page gives no LiteLLM versions affected or fixed for CVE-2026-40217. IOCs are in a GTI Collection for registered users, and the table on the page is empty. GTIG's view that Jet Night depends on stolen keys is an inference from its pricing (about $60 a month for an unlimited plan) and its advertised outages.

Organisations named here

  • Mandiant
  • Google Threat Intelligence Group

CVEs named here

  • CVE-2026-40217

Technologies named here

  • LiteLLM
  • Google Security Operations
  • Ollama
  • AWS CloudTrail
  • AWS Bedrock
  • Gemini API
  • Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform
  • Google Cloud
  • Amazon Web Services
  • Manus
  • Microsoft Azure
  • GitHub
  • Azure
  • AWS
  • agent-infra/sandbox
  • Azure Activity Logs and Diagnostic Logs
  • Azure Cognitive Services (Microsoft.CognitiveServices)
  • Cloud Armor
  • Cloud Audit Logging
  • gcli2api
  • GTI Collection
  • new-api
  • SearXNG

Techniques named here

  • LLMjacking
  • Valid Accounts
  • Session token hijacking
  • Burn and rotate
  • credential validation sweep
  • Credential validation sweeps
  • Exploitation of LiteLLM user ID rebind flaw (CVE-2026-40217)
  • GPU provisioning and quota increase requests
  • Logging configuration tampering
  • Lookalike domain masquerading
  • Privilege escalation via token-creation permissions
  • Secret harvesting from public GitHub repositories
  • Token proxying and resale through LLM Mixers

Concepts named here

  • Least privilege
  • Division of labor in the LLMJacking ecosystem
  • Exposed LLM endpoints as attack surface
  • LLMJacking versus cryptojacking
  • LLM Mixers
  • Shadow LLM

Threat actors named here

  • ai-relay (custom proxy relay infrastructure hosted on deceptive lookalike domains)
  • D1337-KAIROS (persona under which a threat actor rebranded multiple frontier LLMs behind custom Node.js proxy bundles)
  • Jet Night (jet-night.com, token routing service run on stolen third-party API keys, more than 500,000 LLM API calls in under eight hours, nearly one million dollars in token costs passed to the victim, unlimited plan for about $60 USD per month, outages advertised on its public Telegram channel)
  • LLM Mixers (illicit routing gateways that proxy, aggregate and resell unauthorized LLM access to underground subscribers)
  • newapi[.]pro (illicit LLM resale ecosystem fed by the ai-relay proxy infrastructure)
  • UNC6993 (compromised a cloud instance through a misconfigured Service Account key in mid-2026, hosted a session hijacking page, generated additional API keys and accumulated over $100,000 USD in billing charges, used new-api and gcli2api, likely sells access via underground storefronts)

Also named here

  • UNC6993
  • Jet Night
  • D1337-KAIROS