VeilDNS: Post-Quantum DNS Privacy from the First UDP Packet

What it is

VeilDNS is a preprint (ePrint 2026/2629, approved 26 October 2026) by Aditya Singh Rawat, Mahabir Prasad Jhanwar and Rei Safavi-Naini. It encrypts DNS queries and responses with a post-quantum KEM and AEAD inside a single UDP exchange on port 53. Because it keeps the DNS wire format, it needs no new port.

Preconditions / Affected

Query privacy from the first packet holds only if the client already has an authenticated resolver KEM key. The abstract states this condition and does not say how that key is distributed or authenticated. Forward secrecy is optional and starts from the second query. The stateful mode is described as reducing recurring computation and bandwidth compared with the stateless mode.

Benchmark figures

The baseline is DoT, DoH and DoQ authenticated with ML-DSA, measured on cold sessions. The abstract gives these results as "up to" values across the stateless and stateful modes.

On the constrained network profile, the throughput gain reaches 12.4x. The abstract attributes the baseline's cost to extra round trips and CPU in TCP/TLS or QUIC handshakes, and says this cost grows with post-quantum cryptography.

Caveats

• The page is an abstract only. It does not name the KEM or AEAD, the packet format, the network profiles, the resolver software or the hardware.
• The gains are for cold sessions. The abstract gives no figures for warm or long-lived sessions, where DoT, DoH and DoQ amortize their handshakes.
• The figures are maxima, and the abstract does not say which mode produced each one.
• Tamarin results cover query confidentiality, response authentication and forward secrecy. The abstract does not state the threat model or the assumptions behind them.
• The work is a preprint and the abstract does not mention peer review.