
Metasploit Wrap Up: This One Goes to Sixteen!
Rapid7's weekly Metasploit Framework update covering sixteen new modules: ten exploits (five on the CISA KEV list) targeting Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (CVE-2026-20079 auth bypass RCE), SonicWall SMA1000 (CVE-2026-83549 chained RCE), PaperCut NG/MF (CVE-2026-81578 + CVE-2026-82078), JetBrains TeamCity agent-polling XStream deserialization RCE (CVE-2026-63077), Langflow authenticated RCE (CVE-2026-19295), MCPJam Inspector command execution (CVE-2026-23744), SimpleHelp OIDC auth bypass (CVE-2026-48558), Next.js Windows RCE (CVE-2026-75604), and SPIP SQLi/RCE flaws. It also adds a new native Kerberos relay module exploiting ESC8 (AD CS Web Enrollment) via SMB-to-HTTP coercion, a Metasploit handler-detection scanner, a Linux sandbox-evasion module, two Windows persistence techniques, and several bug fixes to the DNS and module metadata subsystems.
What it is
This Metasploit weekly update adds a notable new capability beyond the module list itself: a native Kerberos relay module (server/relay/esc8_kerberos, PR #21709, by Pushpender Rathore) exploiting CVE-2026-20929, an ESC8 (AD CS Web Enrollment) attack via SMB-to-HTTP Kerberos relay. This is distinct from the module summary's mention of "ESC8" — the specific CVE and mechanism aren't in the existing summary.
How it works
The module captures an SMB2 AP-REQ (Kerberos authentication request) from a client that has been coerced into authenticating, then relays that captured authentication over HTTP(S) to the target AD CS Web Enrollment endpoint. This lets the attacker request and obtain a certificate on behalf of the coerced victim, which can then be used to get a valid Kerberos TGT for that victim — all without ever knowing the victim's credentials. This is Metasploit's first native relay-stack implementation of this cross-protocol (SMB→HTTP) Kerberos relay technique.
Preconditions / Affected
- Requires an AD CS environment with Web Enrollment (HTTP) enabled — the classic ESC8 misconfiguration.
- Requires the ability to coerce a victim machine into authenticating via SMB (e.g., via a coercion primitive) to the attacker.
- No authentication/credentials for the victim are needed; the attack relays an intercepted authentication attempt.
What to do
The blog doesn't give mitigation guidance for ESC8 itself (that's standard AD CS hardening — disabling HTTP enrollment or enforcing Extended Protection for Authentication), but for defenders testing exposure, the practical action is to pull the latest Metasploit (msfupdate) and use the esc8_kerberos auxiliary module to validate whether an AD CS deployment is relay-vulnerable, pairing it with an SMB coercion module already in the framework.
Caveats
The post gives no detail on which coercion primitives pair with this module, nor any indication of detection signatures for the relay traffic — only the exploitation chain mechanism is described.
Organisations named here
- ESC8
CVEs named here
- CVE-2025-66516
- CVE-2025-54988
- CVE-2026-20929
- CVE-2026-20079
- CVE-2026-83549
- CVE-2026-83548
- CVE-2026-63077
- CVE-2026-19295
- CVE-2026-23744
- CVE-2026-81578
- CVE-2026-82078
- CVE-2026-48558
- CVE-2026-75604
Technologies named here
- Metasploit Framework
- Elasticsearch
- msfupdate
- Apache Tika
- Metasploit Nightly Installers
- SPIP
- Metasploit Pro
- Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center
- SonicWall SMA1000 WorkPlace
- JetBrains TeamCity
- Langflow
- MCPJam Inspector
- PaperCut NG/MF
- SimpleHelp
- Next.js
- Windows
- vsftpd
- Metasploit
- Cisco
- CISA KEV
- PaperCut
- SonicWall
Techniques named here
- XML External Entity injection
- Blind SQL injection
- Kerberos relay / ESC8 attack
- Sandbox/VM evasion
- Authentication bypass
- SSRF
- Command injection
- Unsafe deserialization
- Authenticated remote code execution
- Windows persistence via registry key abuse
- Windows persistence via Time Provider DLL registration
- DNS cache/forward path manipulation
- Metasploit handler fingerprinting
Related in Offensive Security