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Privacy with Leakage from Falsifiable Assumptions
eprint.iacr.orgpaper

Privacy with Leakage from Falsifiable Assumptions

Privacy with Leakage from Falsifiable Assumptions is an ASIACRYPT 2026 paper by Francesco Berti and Itamar Levi. It replaces simulatability with "secure refreshing", a key-refreshing assumption that evaluation laboratories can test directly, and adds "strongly protected secure refreshing". Using these, it proves privacy of the PSV encryption scheme without assuming a leak-free component.

TL;DR Proposes falsifiable secure-refreshing assumptions for side-channel leakage and proves PSV encryption private without a leak-free component.

Organisations named here

  • Francesco Berti
  • Itamar Levi
  • secure refreshing
  • simulatability
  • strongly protected secure refreshing
  • Yu and Standaert

Technologies named here

  • PSV encryption scheme

Techniques named here

  • Secure refreshing
  • Strongly protected secure refreshing
  • Strongly unpredictable-with-leakage block cipher
  • Pseudorandom functions and permutations