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Meta Phishers Abuse Business Account Manager Service | Huntress
huntress.comwriteup

Meta Phishers Abuse Business Account Manager Service | Huntress

Huntress researchers analyzed a phishing campaign that abused Meta's legitimate "Business Partner Manager" email feature (from security@facebookmail.com) to send convincing phishing lures that bypass typical email validation checks. The threat actor injected a URL into the field meant for a partner's business name, redirecting victims through Google Sites, a fake "Meta Agency Partner Program" page (aussiecleaningservices[.]com), and later a Facebook Messenger chatbot ("AI Strategic Partner") leading to a fake Meta Verified/Content Monetization phishing page (sw[.]run, framed via Netlify) that harvested credentials, MFA codes, and ID documents, exfiltrating them to a Telegram bot with Vietnamese-language text, before Meta shut down the abuse vector.

TL;DR Huntress details a Meta Business Partner phishing campaign that abused a legitimate Meta email service to steal Facebook/Instagram credentials, MFA codes, and ID documents via chatbot lures and Telegram exfiltration.
Document

What it is

A Huntress writeup of a phishing campaign abusing Meta's Business Manager partner-invitation service, letting the attacker send lures from the legitimate noreply@business.facebook.com address. The key detail the summary omits: Meta has since remediated the abuse and the attacks have subsided. The threat actor set up their own Meta business account and used the partner-invitation flow to reach targets.

How it works

The invitation email auto-inserts the requesting partner's name into a fixed sentence: "[Name] is not part of or affiliated with Meta." The attacker put a short URL-bearing phrase in the name field instead, so the rendered sentence reads as an instruction to visit a link. Because delivery is from a real Meta address, the mail passes SPF/DKIM/DMARC-style validation.

Two distinct lure strings are the most useful detection artifacts the page provides — neither is in the summary:

  • May variant: "Get started [URL] – Your information is not part of or affiliated with Meta."
  • June variant: "We agree to cooperate with your business [URL] . Other URLs is not affiliated with Meta." (note the stray space/period).
flowchart TD
    A[Meta partner invite email<br/>noreply@business.facebook.com] --> B{Variant}
    B -->|May| C[sites.google.com/view/profile1012]
    C --> D[aussiecleaningservices.com<br/>fake Agency Partner Program]
    D --> E[Exfil via api.goautolink.com]
    B -->|June| F[FB Messenger bot<br/>'AI Strategic Partner']
    F --> G[Buttons: Get Verification Badge /<br/>Enable Monetization]
    G --> H[Netlify page framed in sw.run<br/>Cloudflare domain]
    H --> I[Exfil to Telegram channel]

The June phishing pages harvested username, password, MFA code, phone number, email, and business-account names.

Preconditions / Affected

Targets are businesses/individuals managing Facebook or Instagram accounts who could plausibly receive a legitimate Business Manager partner invitation. The June variant funnels victims through a Facebook Messenger bot named AI Strategic Partner carrying a Meta corporate logo but describing itself as an interior/exterior painting and drywall team.

What to do

The page gives no vendor-side fix (Meta closed the vector). Actionable hunting from the text:

  • Alert on inbound Meta partner invitations whose "name" field contains a URL or the two lure phrases above.
  • Block/watch IOCs: sites.google[.]com/view/profile1012, aussiecleaningservices[.]com, api.goautolink[.]com, sw[.]run (Cloudflare-fronted, Netlify-hosted pages).
  • Treat any Messenger bot pushing "Get Verification Badge" / "Enable Monetization" buttons as hostile.

Caveats

Attacks have subsided after Meta's action, so the primary vector is closed — this is largely retrospective/detection value. Huntress observed the June variant via a single honeypot hit (June 2) and notes the abuse had already been reported by other victims and researchers.

Organisations named here

  • api.goautolink[.]com
  • aussiecleaningservices[.]com
  • @bulondondam
  • businesshelpcenterpageid563252.netlify[.]app
  • data1mdobot
  • God of Wealth arrives
  • sw[.]run

Technologies named here

  • Google Sites
  • Meta Business Manager / Business Account Manager service
  • Facebook Messenger
  • Facebook
  • Instagram
  • Telegram
  • Meta Agency Partner Program
  • Netlify
  • Meta Verified
  • Cloudflare
  • ipinfo.io
  • Meta Content Monetization program

Techniques named here

  • URL injection into auto-generated message fields
  • Credential phishing landing pages
  • MFA code phishing / fake failure loop
  • Chatbot-based phishing lure
  • Iframe domain concealment
  • Identity document harvesting
  • Data exfiltration via bot API

Threat actors named here

  • Unknown threat actor