eprint.iacr.orgpaperSHAKEing SLH-DSA with Non-profiled SCAs
SHAKEing SLH-DSA with Non-profiled SCAs is an eShard ePrint paper (2026/2584) on correlation power analysis of SLH-DSA-SHAKE, the NIST-standardised hash-based signature scheme. It analyses PRF inputs and selection functions, then combines subtrace averaging, partial-then-total CPA and an efficient exhaustive search to recover the full secret seed, enabling universal forgery. On a 32-bit microcontroller the attack needs about 280 to 559 signatures, and the search finishes within 45 minutes on 72 cores.
TL;DR Shows a CPA attack recovering the full secret seed of SLH-DSA-SHAKE from 280 to 559 power traces on a 32-bit MCU, enabling universal forgery.
Organisations named here
- universal forgery
Technologies named here
- Correlation power analysis
- Exhaustive search algorithm
- 32-bit microcontroller used for the experimental attack
- SLH-DSA
- NIST
- SPHINCS+
- Keccak
- SHAKE
Techniques named here
- Partial-then-total CPA approach to reduce attack complexity
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