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Cybercrime Breaches Klue: Salesforce Data Impacted for Many Victims, including Huntress
huntress.comwriteup

Cybercrime Breaches Klue: Salesforce Data Impacted for Many Victims, including Huntress

Huntress details its investigation into the Klue supply-chain breach, in which a threat actor calling itself Icarus compromised the market-intelligence platform Klue via a long-dormant integration credential, then stole OAuth tokens to pivot into downstream customers' Salesforce and Gong instances, exfiltrating CRM data (contacts, price quotes, opportunity notes) from Huntress and dozens of other companies. The writeup includes IOCs, extortion-email analysis, attribution to Icarus via matching Session Messenger IDs, identification of bulletproof-hosted (AS200593/PROSPERO OOO) leak infrastructure, and IR guidance (log review, session revocation, phishing awareness) for other affected Klue customers.

TL;DR Huntress' first-party DFIR account of the Klue OAuth-token-theft supply-chain breach and the Icarus extortion group behind it, with IOCs and attribution.
Document

What it is

Huntress's running incident log on the Klue breach (updates dated 6/19–6/24/26), in which threat actor Icarus exfiltrated Salesforce CRM data from Klue's downstream customers, including Huntress. Beyond the summary's account, the page tracks an escalation the summary predates: a second, separate unauthorized party now claiming access to Klue-related data.

Preconditions / Affected

You matter here if your organization is a Klue customer or was named in Icarus's leak. Nearly 200 companies are reportedly on the new party's list. Impacted data (per Huntress's own case) is Salesforce-scoped: business contact info (names, work emails, titles, phone, business addresses), business names, products trialed/used, subscription/pricing details, sales communications (quotes, tasks, contacts), and free-form opportunity notes. Huntress states no product, infrastructure, telemetry, password, or payment-card data was impacted.

How it works

The extortion is now two-pronged. Icarus published named victim data on its leak site (hosted on AS200593 / PROSPERO OOO, a Russia-registered ASN carrying a Censys BULLETPROOF designation) on June 22 and is pressuring victims to pay to prevent release. Separately, on June 24 an unverified party claimed it will publish sample data on the ~200 companies that engaged with Icarus, then release victim information daily unless a "compromise" is made — a distinct pressure campaign layered on top of the original breach.

flowchart TD
    K[Klue Salesforce breach] --> I[Icarus: leaks named victims 6/22, ransom pressure]
    K --> S[Second party 6/24: claims access]
    S --> T["Threatens ~200 companies<br/>daily releases unless 'compromise'"]
    T -.unverified.-> V[Under investigation]

What to do

The page's concrete guidance for potentially-impacted organizations:

  • Do not dig through the raw leaked dataset. Leak archives are "often laced with malware." Confirm your inclusion through your incident response team, legal counsel, and a trusted intel partner instead.
  • Treat any ransom negotiation with skepticism — Huntress notes cybercriminals shouldn't be trusted to honor a deal.
  • Watch for sales-specific phishing in coming weeks: attackers may impersonate Huntress or other Klue customers using the stolen CRM data. Verify via known, trusted channels.

Caveats

The 6/24 claims — the second party, the ~200-company list, the daily-release threat — are explicitly unverified and under active investigation "in coordination with security researchers." Huntress's "no product/telemetry/credential impact" finding is qualified as "based on current evidence." Note also that misleading filenames appear in the dump (e.g., stripeGC_Stripe_Account_c.json contained only metadata, not payment data), so a scary filename in the leak does not by itself indicate sensitive exposure.

Organisations named here

  • AS200593
  • Global Retail Brands
  • gofile.io
  • PROSPERO OOO

Technologies named here

  • Session Messenger
  • Klue
  • Gofile
  • Salesforce
  • HubSpot
  • VirusTotal
  • SharePoint
  • Censys
  • Zoom
  • Gong
  • Chorus
  • Clari
  • Google Drive
  • Slack app
  • Huntress
  • OAuth

Techniques named here

  • Supply chain compromise
  • Long-disused credential abuse
  • OAuth token theft
  • Remote command execution on backend servers
  • Bulk data exfiltration via API queries
  • Extortion via email
  • Use of compromised third-party mail infrastructure
  • Data leak site publication for pressure
  • Misleading file naming in leaked data

Threat actors named here

  • Icarus