
https://bughunters.google.com/blog/pagebreak-real-world-findings?utm_source=tldrsec.com&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=tl-dr-sec-348-google-s-pagebreak-scanner-perplexity-s-agent-security-tool-defending-agentically
Google's Product Security team describes three high-severity bugs found by PageBreak, an internal LLM-agent scanner that validates findings by running payloads against live environments. The cases are cache poisoning on apis.google.com (an unkeyed `extra_path` injected into cached JS), XSS on admin.google.com where the agent bypassed the `sig` check by getting the authorize endpoint to sign a `javascript:` URI, and a UXSS in the Tag Assistant extension via a weak `onConnectExternal` origin check and nonce exfiltration. It shows what agentic, deterministically verified scanning can find in well-reviewed targets.
TL;DR Google details three PageBreak agent findings: apis.google.com cache poisoning, admin.google.com XSS with a signature bypass, and Tag Assistant extension UXSS.
Organisations named here
- externally_connectable
- signature bypass
- unkeyed input
- UXSS
Technologies named here
- apis.google.com
- Google Tag Manager
- admin.google.com
- Tag Assistant Extension
- PageBreak
- Chrome
- JavaScript
- LLM
- Tag Assistant
Techniques named here
- String breakout injection in JavaScript
- Signature protection bypass
- Cache poisoning
- Cross-site scripting
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