
New attack turned Microsoft 365 Copilot into 1-click data theft tool
BleepingComputer covers Varonis's SearchLeak research, a three-stage attack chain (CVE-2026-42824, now patched) affecting Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise Search. Attackers craft a URL with a malicious 'q' parameter to prompt-inject Copilot into searching a victim's mailbox/OneDrive/SharePoint, exploit an HTML-rendering race condition to slip an unsanitized img tag past output neutralization, then abuse an SSRF in Bing's "Search by Image" feature to bypass CSP and exfiltrate the stolen data (emails, passwords, meeting details) to an attacker-controlled server via a single click, no user typing required.
What it is
SearchLeak (CVE-2026-42824) is a critical, maximum-severity vulnerability chain in Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise Search found by Varonis. Microsoft fixed it server-side at the beginning of the month.
What to do
Nothing to deploy. The fix is entirely on Microsoft's side — the page states plainly: "With Microsoft having fixed CVE-2026-42824, there's no user action required to mitigate this threat." No patch to apply, no config to change, no version boundary for tenants to check. For an engineer deciding whether to act, the answer is that the action is already taken care of upstream.
Why it's still worth your attention
The reason to read past the CVE is Varonis's generalizable lesson, not this specific bug. Three individually low-impact flaws — a parameter-to-prompt (q) injection, an HTML-rendering race condition, and a Bing "Search by Image" SSRF that bypasses the CSP allowlist — combined into a zero-typing, one-click mailbox/OneDrive/SharePoint exfiltration with no visible indicator (the victim sees only Copilot "thinking").
The takeaway the researchers stress: prompt injection re-weaponizes bug classes defenders had learned to contain. An SSRF "hiding in plain sight behind a CSP allowlist entry" and an HTML injection race — both routine, both normally low-severity — become potent when an LLM sits in the request path. If you run or build on Copilot Enterprise Search or similar AI agents, the durable action item is to reassess whether your existing SSRF and output-sanitization controls still hold once an attacker can steer the agent's behavior via untrusted input, since that context changes their impact.
Caveats
The page names only the outcome and mechanism, not exploitation prerequisites beyond a victim clicking a crafted link. No detection query, no affected version range, and no indication the flaw was exploited in the wild are given.
CVEs named here
Technologies named here
Techniques named here
- Parameter-to-prompt injection
- HTML rendering race condition
- CSP bypass via SSRF
- Data exfiltration via image tag/URL
- SearchLeak
- SSRF
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