Skip to content

Back to the catalog

Socket: Malicious Extensions Drain Axiom Trade and Padre Crypto Sessions
socket.devwriteup

Socket: Malicious Extensions Drain Axiom Trade and Padre Crypto Sessions

Socket's Threat Research team identified six malicious Chrome and Firefox extensions (J7Tracker, VREO, Orbit Tracker, GhostApe, GhostApe Color) that steal authenticated session tokens, Firebase access tokens, and wallet-related data from users of the Axiom Trade and Padre crypto trading platforms. The extensions abuse a byte-identical collection module (axiom-fetch-intercept.js) that reads localStorage/IndexedDB and exfiltrates data by encoding it into URLs opened via browser navigation to Vercel-hosted C2 endpoints, evading manifest-based host-permission review since navigation isn't subject to CORS/CSP connect-src restrictions. The report includes full IOCs (extension IDs, C2 domains, hashes), attribution links via shared code and publisher portfolios, and defender guidance for hunting and blocking the campaign.

TL;DR Six malicious Chrome/Firefox extensions steal Axiom Trade and Padre crypto session tokens and wallet data, exfiltrating via browser-navigation tricks to Vercel-hosted C2 to dodge manifest permission review.
Document

What it is

Six malicious browser extensions targeting Axiom Trade and Padre (now Terminal) crypto traders. The summary covers the campaign shape; what follows is the material a defender needs to hunt and block, which the summary refers to but does not reproduce.

How it works

Two collector variants. The J7Tracker/VREO variant (vamp/axiom-fetch-intercept.js, byte-identical across three extensions) reads Padre localStorage keys padreV2-session, padreV2-stamper, padre-v2-bundles-store-v2, and recovers the Firebase access token — falling back to Firebase Auth's IndexedDB (firebaseLocalStorageDb, stsTokenManager.accessToken) if not in localStorage. On Axiom it collects user, bundle.bundleKey, sBundles, eBundles. Payload is Base64-encoded and exfiltrated via window.open/redirect (not fetch/XHR), so CSP connect-src and manifest host permissions don't reveal the destination. A source comment reads TON BOOKMARKLET AXIOM (INTACT), suggesting bookmarklet-drainer origin. Orbit Tracker uses a separate collector, different C2, and a Telegram bot that reports whether wallet data was found plus the victim's email; it opens axiom.trade on install/update.

Preconditions / Affected

Victim must have one of the extensions installed and be logged into Axiom Trade or Padre — collection is automatic once the session state exists; no manual export needed. Chrome listings (J7Tracker, VREO, GhostApe, GhostApe Color) were removed July 2026. Orbit Tracker remains live on Firefox as of publication.

What to do

Block these extension IDs across managed Chrome/Firefox and search historical inventories:

  • J7Tracker Chrome ingjjklimdeocggninaaapofondbeopd
  • VREO Chrome nngccnjcllkehfiaidagbffjgbikcoij; Firefox vreo@j7tracker.io
  • Orbit Tracker Firefox orbittracker@snapshot.xyz
  • GhostApe Chrome bnolicehjnimmdfkihmojhonickmhegp; GhostApe Color kkkoejaiilcofkhggclkbogjpinhjppm

Module SHA-256: 5b4fbe0658ff76f042c3cc2dfe3d1a3eda963e435a24dfc868cb583bde8c7b91

Hunt DNS/proxy/browser/EDR for these C2s and paths (preserve full URLs — data is encoded in the request):

  • dcfdc-eight.vercel.app — /api/collect?d=
  • snipex-iota.vercel.app — /api/code/
  • susi.bonto.run — /collect?d=
  • cloudflare.bonto.run

Other IOCs: VREO dev email z1417699@gmail.com; hardcoded Telegram ID 7680513699; Orbit Telegram bot 8375941889, recipient 6431519296.

Revoke/rotate affected Axiom and Padre sessions and tokens; review wallet activity for unauthorized transactions. Restrict extensions to an allowlist in profiles used for crypto/financial accounts, and isolate those sessions.

Caveats

Socket notes takedowns won't stop the activity — expect republishing under new IDs/publisher accounts with rotated C2. The durable detection is behavioral: extensions reading authenticated trading-session state and transmitting it externally, not the specific IOCs above.

Organisations named here

  • GhostApe Color
  • Manuel Carsen

Technologies named here

  • Axiom Trade
  • J7Tracker
  • Padre
  • VREO
  • Google Chrome
  • Orbit Tracker
  • Mozilla Firefox
  • GhostApe
  • MockApe
  • GhostApe Color - Theme Customizer
  • Chrome
  • Firefox
  • Chrome Web Store
  • Solana
  • Telegram
  • Vercel

Techniques named here

  • Software Extensions
  • Masquerading
  • User Execution
  • Command and Scripting Interpreter
  • Data from Local System
  • Steal Application Access Token
  • Steal Web Session Cookie
  • Data Encoding
  • Automated Exfiltration
  • Application Layer Protocol
  • Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
  • Web Service

Threat actors named here

  • J7Tracker/VREO operation
  • Orbit Tracker operation