eprint.iacr.orgpaperExploring Fault Injection Attacks on HQC and BIKE Beyond Fujisaki-Okamoto Verification
Presents fault injection attacks on BIKE and HQC decapsulation that target instructions outside the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform, achieving full key recovery with only valid ciphertexts at NIST Level 1 (17392 queries for HQC, about 3 million for BIKE). It also gives a general method for finding effective fault locations by analysing decoder behaviour under perturbed conditions. Attacks were validated with laser fault injection on an STM32H7 microcontroller, showing a wider attack surface for code-based post-quantum KEM implementations.
TL;DR New laser fault attacks on HQC and BIKE decapsulation bypass FO-focused protections and recover the full key, validated on an STM32H7.
Organisations named here
- Fujisaki-Okamoto transform
- key recovery
- laser fault injection
Technologies named here
- Laser fault injection setup on STM32H7 microcontroller
- HQC code-based KEM decapsulation
- BIKE code-based KEM decapsulation
- STM32H7 microcontroller
- HQC
- BIKE
- NIST
- STM32H7
Techniques named here
- Full key recovery using only valid ciphertexts
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