
The OpenSourceMalware Show #10
Podcast/video episode of The OpenSourceMalware Show where researcher Paul McCarty details three active DPRK Lazarus Group supply-chain malware techniques: "version sandwiching" (publishing benign package versions before and after a malicious one, then pinning delivery to the malicious version so latest-version scanners miss it), reuse of Aptos/Tron/Binance BSC blockchain addresses with mutable memo fields as C2 infrastructure to tie campaigns together, and human-readable campaign name strings (e.g. a6-shadow-15, a6-orion-271) embedded in payloads for internal tracking. It also covers broader trends: low-sophistication threat actors using vibe-coding to port payloads across npm/PyPI simultaneously, "package clusters" where only 1-2 of several published packages carry the actual payload, and dynamic imports/payload splitting that pull code from arbitrary CDN URLs at runtime to bypass package managers, firewalls, and Artifactory.
Organisations named here
- easy-day-js
Technologies named here
- OpenSourceMalware
- npm
- PyPI
- Socket
- VS Code Marketplace
- Open VSX
- Cursor and Windsurf
- tailwind-color-shades
- secure-box
- EasyDay JS dependency
- VS Code
- Aptos
- TRON
- mastra
Techniques named here
- Version sandwiching
- Blockchain address/memo reuse as mutable C2 infrastructure
- Campaign name string tagging
- Cross-ecosystem package publishing
- Package clustering
- Dynamic imports at runtime
- Payload splitting
- VS Code tasks.json payload abuse
Threat actors named here
- Lazarus Group
- TeamPCP
- GlassWorm
- Contagious Interview
- Unnamed Chinese threat actor clusters
- Unnamed Indonesian threat actor clusters
- Unnamed Russian threat actor clusters
- DPRK
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