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Lateral Movement Attack: Techniques, Detection & Prevention
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Lateral Movement Attack: Techniques, Detection & Prevention

Huntress details how its Managed EDR and ITDR products detect lateral movement by correlating remote authentication events with subsequent process execution (action pillars: initial code execution, transport, remote authentication, remote code execution) rather than tracking source-side network connections. The piece walks through real-world scenarios including MMC20.Application DCOM abuse, LSASS credential dumping via rundll32/comsvcs.dll (as used by Impacket dcomexec.py and NetExec mmcexec.py), SQL Admin account abuse to enable RDP, and ransomware-precursor activity (shadow copy deletion, ntds.dit exfiltration) caught before payload deployment.

TL;DR Huntress explains its EDR/ITDR telemetry approach for catching lateral movement via DCOM, WinRM, and RDP, with real-world detection case studies.

Organisations named here

  • MMC20.Application

Technologies named here

  • Huntress Managed EDR
  • Windows
  • Microsoft 365
  • Huntress Managed ITDR
  • Entra ID
  • Mimikatz
  • Google Workspace
  • Impacket
  • SQL Server
  • CrackMapExec
  • NetExec
  • GoExec
  • EDR
  • RDP
  • WMI
  • PowerShell

Techniques named here

  • Remote Desktop Protocol lateral movement
  • DCOM/DCE-RPC remote object activation
  • PowerShell Remoting
  • Remote Services & Scheduled Tasks
  • Server Message Block abuse
  • WinRM abuse
  • Credential theft / LSASS dumping
  • Pass-the-hash
  • Reconnaissance / network mapping
  • Shadow copy deletion
  • Clearing logs
  • Killing security tooling processes / stopping core services
  • Credential/data staging and exfiltration
  • RDP enablement via registry
  • Credential stuffing / brute-forcing