
15 Malicious JetBrains Plugins Stole AI API Keys from 70,000 Developers
StepSecurity details a coordinated supply chain attack in which 15 fake AI-powered JetBrains plugins (published across 7 vendor accounts from October 2025 to June 2026) exfiltrated developer AI provider API keys in plaintext to a hardcoded Alibaba Cloud C2 server at 39.107.60.51. The plugins genuinely worked (code review, test generation, DeepSeek/OpenAI chat) but their save() methods intercepted valid-looking sk- API keys, disabled TLS certificate validation warnings JVM-wide, and POSTed the keys over unencrypted HTTP; a "donation wall" also resold stolen keys back to other victims. JetBrains banned the accounts and kill-switched the plugins on June 17, 2026, but StepSecurity confirmed the C2 server was still live two days later, and provides code snippets, network IOCs, and remediation/rotation steps.
What it is
A supply-chain campaign on the JetBrains Marketplace: 15 malicious plugins across 7 vendor accounts, posing as DeepSeek/OpenAI-branded coding tools, that exfiltrated AI provider API keys to a C2 at 39.107.60.51 (Alibaba Cloud, Beijing). The summary covers the shape; the value here is the concrete hunting data — plugin package IDs, the exfil signature, and the timeline showing where the volume actually landed.
Preconditions / Affected
You are exposed only if a developer installed one of these plugins and entered an API key. Of ~70,000 installs, over 53,000 came from just the final two plugins published days before discovery (June 9–10, 2026): CodeGPT AI Assistant (com.my.code.tools, 25,571) and DeepSeek AI Assist (ord.cp.code.ai.kit, 27,727). Note the typo ord. — a useful tell. Full package IDs to hunt for include org.sm.yms.toolkit, com.json.simple.kit, org.bug.find.tools, org.translate.ai.simple, com.yy.test.ai.simple, com.dev.ai.toolkit, com.json.view.simple, com.my.git.ai.kit, org.check.ai.ds, com.review.tool.code, org.code.assist.dev.tool, com.coder.ai.dpt, com.my.code.tools, ord.cp.code.ai.kit.
How it works
Only sk--prefixed keys of exactly 51 characters (OpenAI format) were captured, on the "Apply" click via a save() hook. A seen.add(key) dedup check meant each key was sent once. Exfil was plaintext HTTP POST, Gson-serialized JSON, to http://39.107.60.51/api/software/<name>, carrying a hardcoded header:
X-Api-Key: F48D2AA7CF341F782C1DA JVM-wide custom X509TrustManager suppressed TLS validation warnings to quiet local monitoring.
What to do
- Hunt outbound connections to
39.107.60.51, and any HTTP request bearingX-Api-Key: F48D2AA7CF341F782C1D— this is a strong, unique IOC. - Rotate any OpenAI-format (
sk-) API keys entered into JetBrains plugins during Oct 2025–Jun 2026. Deduplication means a key could have been stolen even if only entered once. - JetBrains removed all plugins, banned the accounts, and fired a remote kill-switch that disables the extensions on IDE relaunch — so relaunching the IDE neutralizes the running plugin, but does not revoke already-stolen keys.
Caveats
- The C2 remained live and responsive on June 19, 2026, three days after removal — stolen keys are likely already in use; rotation is not optional.
- StepSecurity notes it is unclear whether the 53,000 late-stage downloads are organic or inflated, so install counts may overstate real victim reach.
- JetBrains confirmed no compromise of its own systems, source, or infrastructure — this is a marketplace-abuse attack, not a JetBrains breach.
Technologies named here
- JetBrains Marketplace
- StepSecurity Dev Machine Guard
- DeepSeek Junit Test
- git-secrets
- TruffleHog
- DeepSeek Git Commit
- DeepSeek FindBugs
- Gitleaks
- Gson library
- DeepSeek AI Chat
- DeepSeek Dev AI
- DeepSeek AI Coding
- AI FindBugs
- AI Git Commitor
- AI Coder Review
- DeepSeek Coder AI
- AI Coder Assistant
- DeepSeek Code Review
- CodeGPT AI Assistant
- DeepSeek AI Assist
- JetBrains IDEs
- OpenAI API keys
- DeepSeek API keys
- SiliconFlow API keys
- DeepSeek
- OpenAI
- JetBrains
Techniques named here
- Supply chain attack via malicious IDE plugins
- Credential capture on input
- TLS certificate validation suppression
- Plaintext exfiltration over HTTP
- Donation wall monetization scheme
- Remote kill-switch
Threat actors named here
- Unidentified attacker
Related in Supply Chain


