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0x4D31/endpoint-ai-agent-abuse
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0x4D31/endpoint-ai-agent-abuse

endpoint-ai-agent-abuse (EAA) is a curated, evidence-scoped taxonomy of techniques for abusing local, endpoint-resident AI agents — especially coding and developer agents — covering launchers/flags, provider routing, instructions, memory, hooks, plugins, skills, MCP, transcripts, telemetry, and inherited local-user authority. Each technique is tagged by maturity (feasible, demonstrated, observed) and backed by cited incidents, artifacts, or research, with companion files for surfaces, tactics, case mappings, and detection/hunting hypotheses plus a validator script and JSON schema for the catalog.

TL;DR A maintained, evidence-graded taxonomy of attack techniques against local coding/developer AI agents (MCP, hooks, memory, plugins, inherited authority) with detection hunting notes.
Document

What it is

The GitHub repository 0x4D31/endpoint-ai-agent-abuse (EAA), catalog version 0.3.2, released CC0 1.0. The existing summary covers its scope; what it can't carry is how the catalog encodes evidence — the semantics you need to read a claim correctly before acting on it.

How it works

Two dimensions are tracked independently: technique maturity and per-case status.

Maturity has three tiers with precise meanings:

  • feasible — an authoritative source establishes the surface and an agent-specific abuse path, but no public implementation is known.
  • demonstrated — public research or a malicious artifact implements it.
  • observed — an incident-context case shows the scoped action was planted, executed, or produced confirmed impact.

Separately, each case records whether a procedure was present, planted, attempted, executed, or produced confirmed impact. The catalog's scope is deliberately narrow: it is not a general AI-security taxonomy, and product applicability is asserted only where an official doc, primary artifact, incident, or reproducible study supports it — with trust gates, defaults, OS, and product version treated as part of the claim.

The repo is navigated through named files: techniques/index.md (main catalog), scope.md, surfaces.md, tactics.md, cases.md, hunting.md, candidates.md (ideas below the promotion threshold), evidence.md (the full maturity/confidence rules), plus data/catalog.json and data/catalog.schema.json.

What to do

If you contribute or fork, validate structural consistency before submitting:

python3 scripts/validate.py

It cross-checks IDs, metadata, relationships, canonical case mappings, cases, surfaces, tactics, candidates, versions, and local links. Version-bump convention: minor for taxonomy/surface/evidence/naming changes; patch for wording, source updates, and new non-model-changing examples.

Caveats

The two most load-bearing limits, stated by the page itself:

  • observed ≠ activated. For a planting technique, "observed" does not imply later activation; nor does it mean every cited artifact executed successfully or that every reported downstream effect was confirmed.
  • A passing validator confirms structure, not truth. It verifies internal consistency only — claim-level source review is still required, and applicability is version- and default-dependent, so don't generalize a technique across products the catalog hasn't scoped it to.
flowchart TD
    A[Technique entry] --> B{Maturity}
    B -->|feasible| C[Authoritative surface,<br>no public impl]
    B -->|demonstrated| D[Public research<br>or artifact]
    B -->|observed| E[Incident-context case]
    E --> F{Case status}
    F -->|planted| G[Not necessarily<br>activated]
    F -->|executed / confirmed impact| H[Verified effect]

Technologies named here

Techniques named here

  • Execution via endpoint-resident AI agents
  • Persistence via endpoint-resident AI agents
  • Collection via endpoint-resident AI agents
  • Exfiltration via endpoint-resident AI agents
  • Defense evasion via endpoint-resident AI agents
  • Inherited-authority abuse