
Provable Subexponential Algorithms for NIST Third-Round Lattice Families
An IACR ePrint paper by Yiming Gao, Xuyuan Han, and Honggang Hu presenting provable classical subexponential algorithms (running in roughly 2^((1/2+o(1))n/ln ln n) time/space) for recovering short secrets in growing parameter families tied to all seven NIST third-round lattice candidates: Kyber/ML-KEM, FrodoKEM, SABER, NTRU LPRime, Dilithium/ML-DSA, Falcon, and cyclic NTRU-HPS/HRSS. The approach extends the Wagner-style Gaussian sampling framework of Ducas, Engelberts, and Loyer (CRYPTO 2025) and a low-error decision-LWE algorithm, using an exact squared-Euclidean-norm gap to binary-search each secret coordinate, and an "affine slice search" over the public lattice for NTRU/Falcon-type quotient relations. The authors explicitly note the subexponential complexity applies to growing/weakened parameter regimes and does not reduce the concrete security of the currently specified NIST parameter sets.
Organisations named here
- Dilithium
- Falcon
- Honggang Hu
- ML-DSA
- ML-KEM
- NTRU
- Xuyuan Han
- Yiming Gao
Technologies named here
- Kyber / ML-KEM
- FrodoKEM
- Saber
- NTRU LPRime
- Dilithium / ML-DSA
- FALCON
- NTRU-HPS
- NTRU-HRSS
- NIST
- Kyber
Techniques named here
- Affine slice search
- Wagner-style Gaussian sampling framework
- Low-error decision-LWE algorithm
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