
MAJINAHANASHI RANSOMWARE: Yet Another Japanese Locker
Deep-dive intelligence report on Majinahanashi, a Japanese-themed ransomware group that emerged in August 2026, covering its Tor data-leak site (math-captcha gated, non-vanity domain), victimology (15 victims across Europe/Asia/Latin America, avoiding US/English-speaking countries), and technical analysis of its C/C++ locker sample. The malware uses AES-256 with RSA-wrapped per-file keys, appends the .MAJIN extension, deletes shadow copies/USN journals/event logs via vssadmin/bcdedit/fsutil, hijacks the desktop wallpaper, and uses WFP-based network filtering plus I/O priority manipulation to suppress EDR/backup traffic (targeting CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Defender, Veeam, etc.). The article includes a full YARA detection rule, the ransom note text, BTC/qTOX/email contact IOCs, and threat-actor profiling ("THE DOCTOR CAME" persona) plus links to Mimikatz and Advanced IP Scanner usage.
What it is
MAJINAHANASHI (parsed as MAJIN "djinn/ghost" + AHANASHI "story") is a ransomware group whose data leak site first posted victims on 27 June 2026, with 15 victims by August 2026. The name-analysis places it alongside other Japanese-themed lockers YUREI, SINOBI, and TENGU. This report adds file-server and communication-channel IOCs beyond the initial analysis.
How it works
The C/C++ samples (two spotted, ~90KB, creation date 2 July 2026) encrypt files in place with per-file AES-256 keys wrapped by an embedded RSA public key, using AES-NI hardware acceleration with a software fallback. Command execution runs through a thin wrapper that builds command lines and calls CreateProcessA. Beyond deleting shadow copies, it clears event logs and disables hibernate/System Restore/boot recovery. The lock screen is drawn with GDI in Segoe UI and forced via a 1920×1080 BMP written to registry.
Preconditions / Affected
Windows hosts. Note the ADMIN$\Temp\majin.exe drop path — the binary is staged over the admin share for remote execution, implying lateral movement using existing admin credentials, not just local detonation.
What to do
The summary already lists the core IOCs. This page adds several the summary does not carry — add these to detections:
C:\1\service.log— log file written by the sampleADMIN$\Temp\majin.exe— remote-execution drop via admin shareC:\ProgramData\majin.bmpandC:\majin.bmp— generated wallpaper BMPs- DLS onion:
lthicpjqc7gkn5eq3epxndc2uig3yngvcbdya4u3m3byjod5km4yuwqd.onion(non-vanity; math-CAPTCHA gated, 30-day session)
Victimology for targeting/exposure triage: exclusively non-US, non-English-speaking — Switzerland, Italy, Germany, Bulgaria, India, Portugal, France, Chile, Lithuania, Thailand, Colombia. Top sectors are E-Commerce and Manufacturing, then Agriculture, Services, Technology. Top victim revenue ~$61M (Switzerland); average ~$25M.
Caveats
- The author corrected the article: the group contacted them to state they have no US victims — earlier claims of US targeting were retracted.
- "Hello world" / "I love bulgaria" strings in the News section may be misdirection, a personal note, or an unfinished project — not confirmed attribution signal.
- No contact details are published on the DLS, which the author reads as either early-stage operation or deliberate low profile.
- The report is explicitly framed as initial intelligence gathering; the referenced YARA rule and full ransom-note text are sections in the original not reproduced in the fetched excerpt.
Organisations named here
- Gunra
- THE DOCTOR CAME
Technologies named here
- YARA
- Mimikatz
- Advanced IP Scanner
- VSSAdmin
- bcdedit
- wevtutil
- fsutil
- powercfg
- reagentc
- qTOX
- nginx
- Flask
- Tor
- Windows
Techniques named here
- Double extortion
- Data Encrypted for Impact
- Inhibit System Recovery
- Indicator Removal
- Defacement
- Service Execution / Create or Modify System Process
- Native API / Direct System Calls
- Obfuscated Files or Information
- Impair Defenses / Process Termination
- I/O Priority manipulation for evasion
- System Language/Geo Discovery
- Remote Services / Lateral Movement via Admin Shares
- Command and Scripting Interpreter
Threat actors named here
- MAJINAHANASHI
- YUREI
- SINOBI
- TENGU
- Cl0p
- Gunra Ransomware
- Gentlemen Group
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