Inside Kali365, a Device Code Phishing Ecosystem | Huntress
Huntress SOC investigation into Kali365 (also seen as Octopi365/Freedom365), an AI-enabled Phishing-as-a-Service kit that abuses the Microsoft device-code authentication flow to steal M365 tokens and maintain persistent mailbox access even after password resets. The writeup dissects three panel editions (base AiTM/device-code capture, a post-compromise BEC/fraud module using Claude for drafting wire-transfer scam replies, and a self-service reseller tier with crypto billing via OxaPay), and reverse-engineers the companion Electron desktop apps OctoLink Live and OctoLink Sender, which exchange stolen refresh tokens for real ESTSAUTH session cookies to drive undetected Graph mail-sending and admin-portal access — tactics overlapping with Microsoft's Storm-2372 reporting. Includes IoCs and a KQL hunting rule for detecting device-code abuse.
What it is
Kali365 (aka Octopi365 / Freedom365), a device-code phishing-as-a-service kit, as seen in a specific Huntress SOC intrusion set. Beyond the kit's features, this post gives the operational telltales of an active campaign: what the events looked like on the wire and what the victim experienced.
How it works
The lure the SOC saw started with an email pointing to a Canva-hosted page claiming the message was encrypted. Clicking "CLICK HERE" surfaced a device code, then a legitimate Microsoft login page. Once the victim signed in and entered the code, the attacker's device was authorized and the victim was dumped to a "Document Expired" page. Per the browser-history timeline, persistent access was gained in as little as 42 seconds. The panels are React SPAs, so much of the tooling is readable via F12; Huntress identified three "editions" (E1/E2/E3) with a shared set of 33 lure templates.
flowchart LR A[Encrypted-email lure] --> B[Canva page: CLICK HERE] B --> C[Device code shown] C --> D[Real Microsoft login] D --> E[Victim enters code] E --> F[Attacker device authorized ~42s] F --> G[Persistent token, survives MFA + password reset]
Preconditions / Affected
Microsoft 365 / Entra tenants where users can be socially engineered through the device authorization grant. MFA and post-compromise password changes do not evict the attacker, because the stolen refresh token persists.
What to do
The page's core actionable point is a hunting signal, not a patch:
- Treat device code authentication events as a lead for broader compromise (token abuse, mailbox access, persistence, infrastructure), not a one-off anomaly.
- In this campaign the successful
UserLoggedInevents originated from Tencent Cloud IP addresses in AS132203, spiking May 20, 2026 with 80+ successful logins (activity spanned May 18–27). Hunt sign-ins matching that AS/geo pattern. - Huntress used Validin to pivot across the infrastructure, finding 150+ IPs hosting panel variants (most on Tencent Cloud).
- Watch for abuse of the Microsoft Authentication Broker client ID minting refresh tokens (consistent with Storm-2372), which enables downstream device registration and email access.
Caveats
The three edition labels (E1/E2/E3) are Huntress's arbitrary naming, ordered by analysis, not a capability tier. The relationship between the Kali365 / Octopi365 / Freedom365 names is unresolved — possibly rebranding, theft, or operator "shenanigans." Attribution of first-observed-April-2026 is credited to the FBI. The post itself discloses AI assistance was used in the analysis and write-up.
Organisations named here
- Freedom365
- Octopi365
Technologies named here
- Microsoft 365
- Validin
- Microsoft Outlook / Outlook webmail
- OxaPay
- OneDrive
- Telegram bot
- SharePoint
- OctoLink Live
- Microsoft Teams
- OctoLink Sender
- Cloudflare Workers
- Docusign
- admin.microsoft.com
- Cloudflare Turnstile
- entra.microsoft.com
- Claude Sonnet
- Microsoft Exchange / Exchange Online
- SQLite
- Microsoft Graph API
- Canva
- OAuth
- Telegram
- Electron
Techniques named here
- Device Code Authentication Phishing
- Adversary-in-the-Middle reverse-proxy cookie theft
- Refresh token abuse for silent re-authentication
- Bearer token header injection
- Business Email Compromise via compromised mailbox
- Lateral/mass phishing via Microsoft Graph
- Contact-harvest pipeline
- Keyword monitoring on compromised mailboxes
- MFA and admin scanning on captured tokens
- Residential geo-proxying
- Malicious Exchange configuration changes
- Credential/secret scanning of mailboxes
- Fail-open subscription/licensing check
Threat actors named here
- Kali365
- Storm-2372
- EvilTokens
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