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Inside Kali365, a Device Code Phishing Ecosystem | Huntress
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Inside Kali365, a Device Code Phishing Ecosystem | Huntress

Huntress SOC investigation into Kali365 (also seen as Octopi365/Freedom365), an AI-enabled Phishing-as-a-Service kit that abuses the Microsoft device-code authentication flow to steal M365 tokens and maintain persistent mailbox access even after password resets. The writeup dissects three panel editions (base AiTM/device-code capture, a post-compromise BEC/fraud module using Claude for drafting wire-transfer scam replies, and a self-service reseller tier with crypto billing via OxaPay), and reverse-engineers the companion Electron desktop apps OctoLink Live and OctoLink Sender, which exchange stolen refresh tokens for real ESTSAUTH session cookies to drive undetected Graph mail-sending and admin-portal access — tactics overlapping with Microsoft's Storm-2372 reporting. Includes IoCs and a KQL hunting rule for detecting device-code abuse.

TL;DR Huntress tears apart Kali365/Octopi365, a mature device-code-flow PhaaS kit with AI-driven BEC modules and Electron desktop tools (OctoLink Live/Sender) that turn stolen M365 tokens into live, MFA-free browser sessions.
Document

What it is

Kali365 (aka Octopi365 / Freedom365), a device-code phishing-as-a-service kit, as seen in a specific Huntress SOC intrusion set. Beyond the kit's features, this post gives the operational telltales of an active campaign: what the events looked like on the wire and what the victim experienced.

How it works

The lure the SOC saw started with an email pointing to a Canva-hosted page claiming the message was encrypted. Clicking "CLICK HERE" surfaced a device code, then a legitimate Microsoft login page. Once the victim signed in and entered the code, the attacker's device was authorized and the victim was dumped to a "Document Expired" page. Per the browser-history timeline, persistent access was gained in as little as 42 seconds. The panels are React SPAs, so much of the tooling is readable via F12; Huntress identified three "editions" (E1/E2/E3) with a shared set of 33 lure templates.

flowchart LR
  A[Encrypted-email lure] --> B[Canva page: CLICK HERE]
  B --> C[Device code shown]
  C --> D[Real Microsoft login]
  D --> E[Victim enters code]
  E --> F[Attacker device authorized ~42s]
  F --> G[Persistent token, survives MFA + password reset]

Preconditions / Affected

Microsoft 365 / Entra tenants where users can be socially engineered through the device authorization grant. MFA and post-compromise password changes do not evict the attacker, because the stolen refresh token persists.

What to do

The page's core actionable point is a hunting signal, not a patch:

  • Treat device code authentication events as a lead for broader compromise (token abuse, mailbox access, persistence, infrastructure), not a one-off anomaly.
  • In this campaign the successful UserLoggedIn events originated from Tencent Cloud IP addresses in AS132203, spiking May 20, 2026 with 80+ successful logins (activity spanned May 18–27). Hunt sign-ins matching that AS/geo pattern.
  • Huntress used Validin to pivot across the infrastructure, finding 150+ IPs hosting panel variants (most on Tencent Cloud).
  • Watch for abuse of the Microsoft Authentication Broker client ID minting refresh tokens (consistent with Storm-2372), which enables downstream device registration and email access.

Caveats

The three edition labels (E1/E2/E3) are Huntress's arbitrary naming, ordered by analysis, not a capability tier. The relationship between the Kali365 / Octopi365 / Freedom365 names is unresolved — possibly rebranding, theft, or operator "shenanigans." Attribution of first-observed-April-2026 is credited to the FBI. The post itself discloses AI assistance was used in the analysis and write-up.

Organisations named here

  • Freedom365
  • Octopi365

Technologies named here

  • Microsoft 365
  • Validin
  • Microsoft Outlook / Outlook webmail
  • OxaPay
  • OneDrive
  • Telegram bot
  • SharePoint
  • OctoLink Live
  • Microsoft Teams
  • OctoLink Sender
  • Cloudflare Workers
  • Docusign
  • admin.microsoft.com
  • Cloudflare Turnstile
  • entra.microsoft.com
  • Claude Sonnet
  • Microsoft Exchange / Exchange Online
  • SQLite
  • Microsoft Graph API
  • Canva
  • OAuth
  • Telegram
  • Electron

Techniques named here

  • Device Code Authentication Phishing
  • Adversary-in-the-Middle reverse-proxy cookie theft
  • Refresh token abuse for silent re-authentication
  • Bearer token header injection
  • Business Email Compromise via compromised mailbox
  • Lateral/mass phishing via Microsoft Graph
  • Contact-harvest pipeline
  • Keyword monitoring on compromised mailboxes
  • MFA and admin scanning on captured tokens
  • Residential geo-proxying
  • Malicious Exchange configuration changes
  • Credential/secret scanning of mailboxes
  • Fail-open subscription/licensing check

Threat actors named here

  • Kali365
  • Storm-2372
  • EvilTokens