
The ADLC maturity model: 5 stages of agentic development security | Endor Labs
The ADLC maturity model is a proposed five-stage framework from Endor Labs for scoring security controls over coding agents, from unmanaged experimentation to continuous verification. Each stage has requirements on two tracks, agent actions (shell commands, MCP calls, package installs) and agent output (code, dependencies, secrets). It sets stage 3 at deterministic hooks that block actions, gives evidence-based assessment questions, and lists traps such as relying on prompt-level rules.
What it is
The ADLC maturity model is a proposed framework from Endor Labs that scores security controls over coding agents in five stages. It measures security maturity, not adoption. ADLC here means the agentic development lifecycle (plan, build, test, deploy, maintain with agents inside it), not building AI agents as products. The page says no official standard exists, and OWASP SAMM has no practice streams for agentic AI yet.
How it works
Every stage has a requirement on two tracks: agent actions (shell commands, file access, MCP calls, package installs) and agent output (code, dependencies, secrets).
| Stage | Name | Evidence that you are there | Step to the next stage |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Unmanaged experimentation | None. Only human PR review exists. | Inventory agents, models, MCP servers and skills. Require and label human review of agent PRs. |
| 2 | Visibility | You can list agents and MCP servers on request and pull the commands run in a session. Secrets and dependency findings on agent PRs sit with other findings. | Write policy (allowed MCP servers, banned commands, unreadable files). Rank risks by impact. |
| 3 | Deterministic guardrails on actions | You can show a blocked action and the policy that blocked it. | Feed security findings to the agent during the task. Fix prioritization first. |
| 4 | Security inside the agent loop | Agents fix findings before the PR opens, and developers act on findings instead of bulk-dismissing them. | Define outcome metrics for both tracks. Automate evidence. |
| 5 | Measured and continuously verified | You answer customer questionnaires with exports. | Not applicable. |
Stage 3 is the threshold. A rule in a system prompt, AGENTS.md or .cursorrules is guidance, because the model can ignore it or be talked out of it by prompt injection. A hook that blocks a command before it runs is enforcement. The page's test: if the model can bypass a control by changing its mind, it does not count toward stage 3. Stage 3 controls are least-privilege credentials, sandboxing, MCP allowlists, action policies, and install-time blocking of malicious packages.
Stage 4 often stalls because agents open many more PRs, which multiplies findings. The page recommends reachability-based prioritization and exploitability confirmation on PRs.
Stage 5 adds adversarial regression tests (plant a malicious instruction in a test issue and confirm the action is blocked), bypass checks (agents cannot disable hooks, edit their own policy or route around an MCP allowlist), policy drift reviews when new agents or MCP servers appear, and AI components in SBOMs.
What to do
Score each area separately: inventory, permissions and tool access, code security, secrets, supply chain, oversight, and monitoring and response. For each assessment question, produce the artifact or score it missing. Examples:
- Export every MCP server in use this week.
- Show a blocked action and its policy.
- Show a secret caught before commit, and whether it was live.
- Show the last prompt injection regression test result.
The lowest-scoring area is the real stage. A team with stage 4 code security and stage 1 inventory is a stage 1 team. Spend on that gap first.
Metrics suggested by stage:
- Share of agent sessions under policy (stages 2 and 3).
- Unapproved MCP servers found per month (stage 2).
- Risky actions blocked, by policy (stage 3).
- Time to remediate agent-introduced findings (stage 4).
- False positive rate on findings sent to developers and agents (stage 4).
- Share of audit evidence produced automatically (stage 5).
Traps named: counting tools as progress, relying on prompt-level rules (a stage 2 team believing it is at stage 3), approving a few agents while unreviewed MCP servers spread, and noisy blocking checks that push developers to unmanaged tools and personal accounts.
Caveats
The page is a vendor post. Its stage 3 and 4 examples are Endor Labs products (Coding Agent Governance, Package Firewall, AURI, AI Security Review). Endor Labs reports up to 95% false positive reduction for AI SAST and 83% fewer blocked PRs, with no method given. The page says stages are mostly sequential but areas can mature at different speeds. It cites ISO/IEC 42001 and 2026 CISA and Five Eyes agentic AI guidance, and advises confirming applicable clauses with an auditor.
Organisations named here
- ADLC maturity model
- CISA
- Cloud Security Alliance
- OWASP SAMM
Technologies named here
- Endor Labs package firewall
- OWASP SAMM
- AGENTS.md and .cursorrules
- SBOM
- Endor Labs
- AURI
- Model Context Protocol
- Claude Code
- Cursor
- OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
- ISO/IEC 42001
Techniques named here
- Poisoned MCP server leading to a destructive command
- Malicious package becoming compromised code in production
- Reachability-based prioritization of findings
- Exploitability confirmation on pull requests
- Prompt Injection
- Excessive Agency
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