
How AI Is Reshaping Crypto Security, with Michael Coates
An interview with Solana Foundation CISO Michael Coates dissects the July 2026 Coldcard hardware-wallet hack, where a 2021 code change swapped a hardware RNG for a software pseudo-random source, collapsing seed entropy from 128 to ~40 bits and letting attackers offline-brute-force and drain ~$116M in Bitcoin from 5,200+ wallets without touching a device — despite prior audits that only checked whether a value was set, not its source. Coates draws lessons on distrusting single audits, using multi-sig to remove single points of failure (including the wrench attack), and phishing-resistant hardware keys (e.g. YubiKey) as the fix for pixel-perfect deepfake and phishing attacks. He also discusses AI's cat-and-mouse effect on offense vs. defense, Anthropic's disclosed Claude-driven Chinese state espionage campaign, and Solana's STRIDE continuous security-rating program for DeFi as an automated, computer-scale response to agentic nation-state threats.
What it is
An interview (Bits to Bricks podcast) with Solana Foundation CISO Michael Coates, structured around the July 2026 Coldcard drain. The mechanism, entropy collapse, and named threats (deepfakes, YubiKeys, Anthropic's Nov 2025 Claude espionage disclosure, STRIDE) are already in the summary. What it adds is concrete defensive practice the summary compresses to two nouns.
What to do
Coates's practical prescriptions, beyond "use multi-sig / use a YubiKey":
- Multi-sig topology, not just multi-sig. Concretely 2-of-3 or 3-of-5, with keys on different hardware held by different people. This is what removes the single point of failure and defangs the wrench attack (no single holder can move everything).
- For non-experts, three fallbacks that keep the property without teaching everyone to co-sign: a trusted broker as one signer (e.g. an educated spouse); geographic spread (one device in a safe deposit box across town); and keeping a single-signer wallet for small everyday amounts.
- Don't ignore the endpoint. People go deep on cold storage and multi-sig, then never ask whether the machine in front of them runs antivirus or an updated OS.
- Weigh manufacturer pedigree when choosing hardware — a small well-meaning team misses what a vendor with budget for layered testing catches. Never trust a single review.
- Circuit breakers: code that trips on its own when something goes wrong, the model Coates wants for DeFi (alongside STRIDE, launched April 2026), borrowed from aviation/critical infrastructure.
Caveats
This is an opinion/interview piece — no CVE, patch version, or detection query. Self-custody advice comes with Coates's own qualifier: it only works "if you really know what you're doing," because there is no recourse when it fails.
Organisations named here
- Code Red worm
- Coldcard hack
Technologies named here
- Coldcard hardware wallets
- YubiKey
- STRIDE
- Claude
- Solana
- Bitcoin
- Coldcard
Techniques named here
- Offline brute-force of seed phrase
- Wrench attack
- AI-generated deepfake video call
- Password phishing
- Self-propagating worm / agentic adversary propagation
Threat actors named here
- Chinese state group
- Nation-state actors
- Code Red
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