Shor
Shor is a source-available, multi-tenant autonomous pentesting platform where a ~17-agent LLM pipeline (discovery, hypothesis, adversarial screening jury, exploitation, proof replay) attacks a target URL and optionally its connected source repo. It wields 30+ real offensive tools (sqlmap, dalfox, nuclei, jwt_tool, hydra, ffuf, etc.) plus SAST/secret/SCA tools (Semgrep, Gitleaks, TruffleHog, OSV-Scanner, Trivy) in white-box mode, and only reports findings whose PoC is deterministically re-executed and confirmed by a code-enforced safety layer under a signed Rules of Engagement, with scan authorization gated behind single-use human-minted tokens on its MCP/automation surface.
What it is
Shor (by Keygraph, Inc.) is a source-available autonomous web pentesting platform. The catalog summary covers the agent pipeline, tool arsenal, and prove-it verification — but omits three things an engineer deciding whether to adopt it needs: the license terms, an opt-in cross-scan memory subsystem, and the specifics of its false-positive machinery.
Licensing (the adoption gate)
Shor is licensed under PolyForm Noncommercial License 1.0.0 — explicitly NOT an OSI open-source license. You may use, modify, fork, and share it for any noncommercial purpose if you keep the copyright/Required Notice lines and credit "Based on Shor by Keygraph, Inc." You may not sell it, bundle it into a paid product, or run it as a paid/hosted service without a separate commercial license. Contributions require signing a Contributor License Agreement. If you intended to offer scanning as a service or embed it in a commercial product, this is a hard stop absent a commercial deal.
Retrieval-memory layer (not in the summary)
Shor ships a two-tier memory system that is feature-flagged and off by default:
- A per-project tier remembers prior findings for a target so repeat scans build on earlier work.
- A shared, cross-tenant knowledge tier pre-seeded with distilled MITRE CAPEC and recent web-security write-ups.
Design constraints worth noting: memory feeds agents ideas to try, not verdicts to trust — the prove-it oracle stays the sole arbiter. Third-party research is treated as untrusted input to guard against retrieval poisoning, and promotion of a finding into the shared cross-tenant tier is gated behind consent plus mandatory secret/PII scrubbing. If you enable the shared tier, you are opting into cross-tenant data flow with those guards as your only protection.
False-positive machinery, in detail
Beyond the PoC replay the summary mentions, the end-stage refinement gate scores findings on independent evidence axes (code path confirmed, premise valid, in scope, location verified) that can only lower an over-confident label. Duplicates collapse to one canonical record; out-of-scope or "god-mode" artifacts are demoted, not deleted — everything demoted lands in a review appendix, so nothing is silently dropped.
Outputs and containment specifics
Outputs include SARIF export and fingerprinted findings tracked as new/recurring/resolved across a project's scan history, plus opaque read-only share links and (white-box) per-finding "fix prompts" citing exact file and line. Containment adds detail the summary skips: per-tenant egress firewalling, default-deny scope, per-scan isolated environments with scoped identity/secrets, and cancelling a scan as the kill switch.
Lineage
Shor's discovery+verification pipeline is ported from Anthropic's defending-code reference harness, with agent orchestration following Anthropic's Building Effective Agents (orchestrator-workers, evaluator-optimizer). It cites XBOW, PentestGPT, Shannon, Strix, and HexStrike AI as prior art — useful if you're comparing agentic pentest tools.
Organisations named here
- MITRE CAPEC
- PolyForm Noncommercial License 1.0.0
Technologies named here
- Shor
- Nmap
- naabu
- httpx
- Katana
- Ffuf
- Arjun
- paramspider
- subfinder
- dnsx
- gau
- waybackurls
- kxss
- wafw00f
- nuclei
- sqlmap
- commix
- nosqli
- xsstrike
- Dalfox
- ssrfmap
- sstimap
- jwt_tool
- hydra
- interactsh-client
- Playwright
- Semgrep
- Gitleaks
- TruffleHog
- OSV-Scanner
- Trivy
- XBOW
- PentestGPT
- Shannon
- Strix
- HexStrike AI
- SARIF
- Model Context Protocol
Techniques named here
- Hypothesis-driven vulnerability analysis per bug class
- Adversarial jury screening of candidate findings
- Automated exploitation with real tools
- Proof-of-concept replay / deterministic oracle verification
- Finding refinement and deduplication gate
- Retrieval-augmented agent memory
- Black-box scanning
- White-box scanning
Related in Offensive Security