aikido.devarticleEverybody's shipping code they can't read
An Aikido Security blog post arguing that AI coding agents (e.g. Claude Cowork-style tools) now install npm dependencies on a user's behalf without any human reviewing what gets pulled in, citing the recent @mastra ecosystem attack where 141 packages were republished in a 45-minute burst with a malicious date-library lookalike that dropped a wallet-stealing payload and self-deleted. It also flags "slopsquatting," where attackers preemptively register package names that LLMs are known to hallucinate, and argues trust decisions need to move to install-time blocking rather than manual diff review.
TL;DR Aikido blog argues AI coding agents install unvetted npm packages for users, using the 141-package @mastra supply-chain attack and slopsquatting as evidence that trust checks must move to install-time.
Organisations named here
- slopsquatting
Technologies named here
- @mastra AI-agent ecosystem
- Aikido Device Protection
- Malicious look-alike date library package
- Claude Cowork
- npm install
- Affected core @mastra package
- npm
- mastra
Techniques named here
- Slopsquatting
- Supply chain package poisoning
- Malicious install script with self-deletion
- Crypto wallet hunting and persistence
Threat actors named here
- Unnamed attacker
Related in Supply Chain
