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Active and Passive Attacks against TPM 2.0-based Full Disk Encryption
eprint.iacr.orgpaper

Active and Passive Attacks against TPM 2.0-based Full Disk Encryption

Active and Passive Attacks against TPM 2.0-based Full Disk Encryption is an ePrint paper by Freud, Hein and Klein (BSI). It shows SPI bus sniffing and interception against discrete TPMs on a mini PC and a notebook, plus a prototype UEFI firmware attack in QEMU that affects firmware TPMs. The attacks break BitLocker and all current Linux FDE implementations, including those using TPM parameter encryption.

TL;DR Demonstrates SPI bus and UEFI-level attacks that defeat BitLocker and Linux TPM 2.0 FDE, even with parameter encryption.
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Organisations named here

  • BSI
  • discrete TPM
  • firmware TPM
  • parameter encryption
  • SPI bus sniffing
  • TPM sealing

Technologies named here

  • Windows BitLocker
  • TPM 2.0 sealing mechanisms
  • LUKS
  • BitLocker
  • QEMU
  • Linux
  • Windows
  • TPM 2.0

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