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CAREFUL ADOPTION OF AGENTIC AI SERVICES FINAL

A joint guidance document from ASD's ACSC, US CISA/NSA, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, NCSC-NZ and NCSC-UK on securely adopting LLM-based agentic AI systems. It details agentic-specific risk categories — privilege compromise and scope creep, identity spoofing/agent impersonation, confused-deputy attacks, insecure static permission checks, goal misalignment/specification gaming, and deceptive or emergent agent behaviour — with concrete scenarios (a procurement agent with excessive privileges, a support-triage agent with a compromised third-party scheduling component, an update agent tricked into deleting firewall logs). It closes with lifecycle best practices for designing, developing, deploying and operating agents securely, plus recommendations on threat-intel sharing and agent-specific evaluations.

TL;DR Five-eyes agencies' joint guidance on agentic AI security risks (privilege compromise, confused deputy, identity spoofing, specification gaming) and lifecycle best practices for safe deployment.

Organisations named here

  • ASD's Australian Cyber Security Centre
  • Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
  • CISA
  • NCSC-NZ
  • NCSC-UK
  • NSA

Technologies named here

  • LLM-based agentic AI systems
  • LLM

Techniques named here

  • Prompt Injection
  • Indirect prompt injection
  • Confused deputy pattern
  • Privilege compromise / scope creep
  • Identity spoofing / agent impersonation
  • Exploiting stale authorization decisions
  • Lateral movement via poor segmentation
  • Specification gaming / goal misalignment
  • Over-optimisation
  • Deceptive/sycophantic behaviour
  • Emergent/unpredictable capabilities
  • Overbroad instruction execution
  • Confused deputy