CAREFUL ADOPTION OF AGENTIC AI SERVICES FINAL
A joint guidance document from ASD's ACSC, US CISA/NSA, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, NCSC-NZ and NCSC-UK on securely adopting LLM-based agentic AI systems. It details agentic-specific risk categories — privilege compromise and scope creep, identity spoofing/agent impersonation, confused-deputy attacks, insecure static permission checks, goal misalignment/specification gaming, and deceptive or emergent agent behaviour — with concrete scenarios (a procurement agent with excessive privileges, a support-triage agent with a compromised third-party scheduling component, an update agent tricked into deleting firewall logs). It closes with lifecycle best practices for designing, developing, deploying and operating agents securely, plus recommendations on threat-intel sharing and agent-specific evaluations.
Organisations named here
- ASD's Australian Cyber Security Centre
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
- CISA
- NCSC-NZ
- NCSC-UK
- NSA
Technologies named here
- LLM-based agentic AI systems
- LLM
Techniques named here
- Prompt Injection
- Indirect prompt injection
- Confused deputy pattern
- Privilege compromise / scope creep
- Identity spoofing / agent impersonation
- Exploiting stale authorization decisions
- Lateral movement via poor segmentation
- Specification gaming / goal misalignment
- Over-optimisation
- Deceptive/sycophantic behaviour
- Emergent/unpredictable capabilities
- Overbroad instruction execution
- Confused deputy
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