
Socket: "JeetBot" Twitch Extension Steals 31,000 Users' OAuth Tokens
Socket's Threat Research Team analyzed "Twitch Enhanced Viewer | JeetBot", a Chrome/Firefox extension with 31,000 users that captures the user's live Twitch OAuth session token from the Authorization header and forwards it as an &auth= query parameter to proxy servers operated by JeetBot, a Russian-language Twitch/Kick/VK-Live bot SaaS, exempting only ten hardcoded Russian streamer channels. Earlier v4.x builds POSTed tokens outright to dedicated set-token endpoints (with backups on deno.dev/deno.net) and included Russian-language comments indicating deliberate rate-limited exfiltration; the account-scoped bearer token grants chat, whispers, and settings access, contradicting both store listings' "no data collection" claims. Firefox has since shipped a fix (85.8.7) after Socket's disclosure; the Chrome build remained vulnerable at publication.
What it is
"Twitch Enhanced Viewer | JeetBot," a Chrome (ID pnhhdhhcadcjfckjhpmjneldiegbojfb, 30,000 users) and Firefox (twitchenhancedviewer@example.com, 552 users) extension analyzed by Socket. It markets ad-blocking, forced 1080p, region-unlock and channel-point auto-collection, and on the same requests forwards each viewer's live Twitch OAuth session token to proxy servers run by the JeetBot bot SaaS. The existing summary covers the capture-and-forward mechanism; what follows is the version boundary, the remediation ordering, and the IOCs it omits.
Preconditions / Affected
- Chrome build 85.8.4 (current at publication) still forwards the token. The fix (submitted, awaiting review) hardcodes
authto empty and strips auth-token parameters. - Firefox 85.8.7 removes the forwarding — installs on older code keep forwarding until they update.
- Inline
&auth=forwarding is present from v85.2.2 (May 20, 2026) through current builds; the version numbering jumped from 7.2.6 (April 25, 2026) to 85.2.2. Earlier v4.x builds (e.g. 4.8, Jan 8, 2026) POSTed tokens to/set-tokenendpoints (now decommissioned).
What to do
Order matters — removing the extension alone does not revoke a token already exfiltrated:
- Firefox: update to 85.8.7 or later. Chrome: disable or remove the extension until the fixed build ships.
- In Twitch settings, disconnect all sessions and re-authenticate to invalidate any forwarded token (a bearer token needs no password/2FA to abuse — chat, whispers, channel points, settings).
- Security teams: block the IOC infrastructure at the network layer and inventory endpoints for both extension IDs.
Key IOCs (defanged):
- Proxies:
enhanced[.]jeetbot[.]cc,proxy[.]morphilina[.]me,ext-03[.]jeetbot[.]cc - Config API:
ext-styles[.]jeetbot[.]cc/api/v1/proxies - IPs:
152[.]53[.]177[.]186(netcup, AS197540),132[.]243[.]113[.]25and80[.]74[.]26[.]162(CLODO, AS216154) - Chrome SHA-256
e17e1e671b597da19b89c5b2d0fa821e90e627860e756ae4947ed27c035330a8; Firefox SHA-256141c35607dc0e8e400deb380126b3052bd0495b4d37c8dd979c6aa0204b142fc - MITRE: T1176, T1539, T1557, T1071.001
Caveats
- The token rides in the URL query string, so it lands in cleartext in the proxy's request logs regardless of transport encryption.
- The operator controls, server-side via the proxy catalog API, which host receives the token — blocking a single default host is insufficient.
- Ten hardcoded Russian streamer channels (
pch3lk1n,flamie,dosia, etc.) are exempted from forwarding; every other channel forwards. - The JeetBot team acknowledged the issue post-publication and shipped the Firefox fix; the "no data collection" claims in both store listings and the privacy policy (
thebeholderbotapi[.]vercel[.]app/twitch-conf) remained contradicted by the live Chrome build.
Organisations named here
- Popov Aleksandr Alekseevich
- T1071.001
- T1176
- T1539
- T1557
Technologies named here
- Socket's Chrome extension protection
- Twitch Enhanced Viewer | JeetBot
- Twitch Enhanced Viewer | JeetBot v4.x builds
- Twitch OAuth session tokens
- Chrome
- Firefox
- OAuth
- Chrome Web Store
- MITRE ATT&CK
- Twitch
Techniques named here
- Browser Extensions
- Steal Web Session Cookie
- Adversary-in-the-middle
- Application Layer Protocol
Threat actors named here
- JeetBot
- HISHIMIRO
- cybergnyda@gmail[.]com
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