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Standard for "transferable to arbitrary addresses" on tokenized RWAs? (locked v4 pools quoted in tokenized stocks)
ethereum-magicians.orgthread

Standard for "transferable to arbitrary addresses" on tokenized RWAs? (locked v4 pools quoted in tokenized stocks)

An Ethereum Magicians forum thread dissects a novel rug/bricking vector emerging from a launchpad (sender.family) that locks 100% of token supply forever into a single one-sided Uniswap v4 position, where the quote asset can be a KYC-gated tokenized stock (Ondo's NVDA/TSLA/AAPL tokens) rather than ETH or a stablecoin. Because Uniswap v4 routes all pool balances through a shared PoolManager singleton and pays swap/fee output to arbitrary addresses, the RWA issuer must permanently allowlist the PoolManager and any counterparty; if the issuer later tightens its transfer-registry rules, the permanently locked pool becomes irrecoverable with funds stuck inside. The author notes the launchpad's current mitigation is only an empirical point-in-time transfer test (moving a balance between two addresses) against an asset with an admin-controlled, stateful ERC-3643 canTransfer function, and asks whether there's any way to verify "transferable to arbitrary addresses" onchain before pool creation, and whether permanent lockers should categorically refuse upgradeable/pausable quote assets.

TL;DR Forum analysis: permanently-locked Uniswap v4 pools quoted in KYC-gated tokenized RWAs (Ondo stocks) can be irrecoverably bricked if the issuer's transfer registry later restricts the PoolManager or counterparties, with no onchain way today to verify "transferable to arbitrary addresses" before locking.

Organisations named here

  • Ondo
  • TWAMM

Technologies named here

  • sender.family
  • clanker
  • Uniswap v4
  • Ondo tokenized stocks
  • zora
  • ERC-3643
  • Ethereum
  • Solidity

Techniques named here

  • Empirical transferability check
  • Sandwich attack risk on permissionless buyback