35 results for “OWASP”

Oversecured guide to eight vulnerability categories that lead to account takeover in mobile banking and fintech apps: WebView JavaScript bridge token leakage, Intent Redirection, hardcoded tokens, deeplink hijacking, insecure token storage, localhost OAuth listeners, AIDL abuse and weak biometric auth. It includes a WebView PoC based on Samsung SmartThings CVE-2022-30746 and maps findings to OWASP MASVS, PCI DSS and PSD2. It argues taint analysis plus dynamic PoC is needed to find multi-component chains.

oversecured.comarticleAdded 29 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

An AIBOM is a machine-readable inventory of models, datasets, dependencies, AI services, agents and MCP servers, with evidence of origin, license, integrity and evaluation. The Endor Labs explainer walks through a worked CycloneDX example for a fine-tuned support assistant. It compares CycloneDX ML-BOM, SPDX 3.x, the OWASP AIBOM project and the May 2026 CISA/G7 guidance, and lists what an AIBOM cannot show: runtime behavior and agent actions.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 29 Oct 2026🧠 AI

AIBOM explainer from Endor Labs: an AI bill of materials is a machine-readable inventory of models, datasets, dependencies, AI services, agents and MCP servers, with origin, license and integrity evidence. It walks through a CycloneDX entry for a fine-tuned model, compares CycloneDX ML-BOM, SPDX 3.x, the OWASP AIBOM Generator and the May 2026 CISA/G7 minimum-elements guidance, and lists a six-step build process. It also states what an AIBOM cannot show: model safety, runtime behavior and coding-agent actions.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 29 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

ADLC compliance is Endor Labs' interpretation of how NIST SSDF (SP 800-218), the OWASP LLM and Agentic Top 10 lists, and the EU AI Act apply to software built with coding agents. It splits requirements into a code surface and an action surface (shell, files, MCP calls, package installs). It gives a four-step EU AI Act scoping path and says that system prompt rules and agent self-reports are not audit evidence.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 28 Oct 2026🧠 AI

ADLC compliance guide from Endor Labs that maps agentic development to NIST SSDF (SP 800-218 v1.1), the OWASP LLM Top 10 2025 and Agentic Top 10, and the EU AI Act as amended by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744. It splits controls into a code surface and an action surface (shell, file access, MCP calls, package installs). It gives a four-step AI Act scoping path, the new Annex III date of 2 December 2027, and evidence guidance. It states the crosswalk is the vendor's interpretation, not legal advice.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 28 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Part 3 of the AWS Security Blog series on cybersecurity careers profiles three AWS staff: Brandon Caldwell (application security, empathy and communication), Kurt Heath (self-taught pen tester, cautious AI use) and Seth Jeacopello (code review, managing attention). It gives practical advice: practice on vulnerable machines and read the logs, build CTF and GitHub portfolios, and write clearly. It lists TryHackMe, Hack The Box, the OWASP Top 10, OWASP Cheat Sheet Series, Darknet Diaries and AWS Skill Builder.

aws.amazon.comarticlePublished and added 27 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Shannon is a white-box AI pentester (@keygraph/shannon) that analyzes an application's source code, then attacks the running instance and reports only findings with a working PoC. The Hackers Arise tutorial runs it against OWASP Juice Shop in Docker on Kali, using OpenRouter (free Nemotron) and local Ollama (Qwen 2.5 Coder 7B) via a models.json file. Output includes PDF, Markdown, JSON and SARIF reports.

hackers-arise.comarticlePublished and added 26 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Code security for new coders is a Datadog Security Labs primer for vibe coders building with coding agents. It lists setup and follow-up security questions to ask the agent, such as OWASP top 10 reviews, hardcoded secrets and outdated packages. It also explains first-party versus third-party code, supply chain risk, and SCA, SAST, IAST, DAST, IaC and secret scanning tools.

securitylabs.datadoghq.comarticleAdded 29 Oct 2026, published 26 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Omar Santos walks through his eight-part AI-agents-for-cybersecurity repository: LLM building blocks (LangChain, RAG), then security agents with LangGraph, CrewAI, DeepAgents and MCP servers (nmap, CISA KEV, Shodan), a hardening guide for six agentic frameworks, token-cost control for agents, and a spec for a supervisor-led, human-gated security-assessment harness. It covers concrete design lessons such as least-privilege subagents, staged response actions, single-use approvals bound to exact actions, kill switches, and mapping controls to the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications. Also notes Project CodeGuard rules shipped for AI coding assistants.

becomingahacker.orgarticleAdded 13 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

JFrog proposes the Agentic Process Evidence Protocol, an open spec that records coding-agent sessions (harness and agent version, model ID, tool and MCP calls, prompts, owner, human reviewer) as signed in-toto/DSSE attestations bound to a git commit, artifact or release. Policy-as-code release gates can then check for approved LLMs and MCP tools, an accountable human and adherence to guidelines, and the logs allow post-release audit. The post gives mock session-log and evidence JSON, ties the approach to EU AI Act Articles 12 and 14, OWASP AISVS and SLSA, and points to a GitHub reference repo, with JFrog AppTrust as the commercial implementation.

jfrog.comarticleAdded 14 Oct 2026, published 12 Oct 2026🧠 AI

JFrog proposes Agentic Process Evidence, an open protocol that records AI coding agent sessions (harness, model ID, tool calls, MCP use, prompts, owner, human reviewer) as signed in-toto/DSSE, SLSA-compatible attestations bound to commits, artifacts and releases. Policy-as-code gates can then block releases that used unapproved LLMs or MCP tools, or that lack an accountable human. It maps the approach to EU AI Act Articles 12/14, OWASP AISVS and ISO/IEC 42001, and includes example session-log and evidence JSON. The post also promotes JFrog AppTrust's Prompt to Release Traceability.

jfrog.comarticleAdded 14 Oct 2026, published 12 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Commentary on the 2025 OWASP Top 10 update presented at OWASP Global AppSec in Washington, D.C. Broken Access Control stays #1, Security Misconfiguration and the new Software Supply Chain Failures category (replacing Vulnerable and Outdated Components) rise to #2 and #3, and Cryptographic Failures, Injection and Insecure Design drop. The author adds context on agentic AI and MCP identity and authorization, AI-assisted SAST, non-human identities, CISA Secure-by-Default, OWASP SPVS, and slopsquatting and AI coding assistant risks.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 12 Oct 2026🛡️ Security

Snyk argues AI coding agents reliably write broken access control (BOLA/IDOR, OWASP's top category since 2021) because the facts needed to add an ownership check — what an object belongs to, who may access it, where tenant boundaries sit — are tacit product knowledge that exists nowhere in the code or prompt an agent sees. It explains why SAST tools catch patterned sub-categories like path traversal or SSRF but structurally cannot catch CWE-639/862/863 (missing or incorrect authorization), since there's no bad pattern to match, and proposes reasoning over an assembled "application-context graph" of architecture, data flows and trust boundaries instead. It closes with a five-step team checklist (inventory ID-accepting endpoints, document ownership rules, add authorization-specific PR review, write cross-tenant tests, run deep contextual analysis) and pitches Snyk's Evo Agentic AppSec as the tool built around that approach.

snyk.ioarticlePublished and added 1 Oct 2026🧠 AI

Analysis of 30+ CVEs filed against Model Context Protocol servers, clients, SDKs, and proxies in the first two months of 2026, showing the flaws concentrated in plumbing (proxies, registries, transports) rather than tool implementations. It walks through CVE-2025-6514 (CVSS 9.6 RCE in mcp-remote via unsanitized OAuth authorization_endpoint URLs shelled out to launch a browser), the chained Atlassian MCP server CVEs (CVE-2026-27825/CVE-2026-27826), unauthenticated public registries, and a systemic stdio-transport advisory, then ties the findings to the NSA's May 2026 MCP security CSI and the OWASP MCP Top 10.

bex.coarticleAdded 26 Sep 2026, published 23 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

A long-form explainer distinguishing attack surface from attack vector and asset inventory, breaking the surface into network/perimeter, identity/permissions, application/code, and data/storage components, and covering how to map it via the OWASP Attack Surface Analysis Cheat Sheet, measure it (Relative Attack Surface Quotient, Carnegie Mellon's attack surface metric), and reduce it. It also contrasts external attack surface management with cyber asset attack surface management and closes with a pitch for Orca's agentless SideScanning and Unified Data Model.

orca.securityarticlePublished and added 21 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Adversa AI argues that AI agent security lives in the harness, the loop, tool executors, context/memory management, approval gates and sandbox wrapped around an LLM, not in the model itself, and catalogs nine recurring harness failure classes. It details the firm's own research: SymJack (a symlink-based approval-prompt bypass that let six tested coding agents write attacker-controlled MCP config), GuardFall (shell-matcher bypass exploitable in 10 of 11 open-source agents tested), and TrustFall (MCP servers auto-executing on folder-trust acceptance in Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Cursor CLI and GitHub Copilot CLI), plus references to IDEsaster's 30+ AI-IDE vulnerabilities, a Hugging Face download-counter side channel (CVE-2026-54316), and Novee Security's Black Hat findings on credential leakage across Gemini CLI/Codex trust boundaries. It closes with concrete mitigations: Meta's Agents Rule of Two, allowlisting over blocklisting, treating agent config as executable code, and chain-of-event monitoring mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications.

adversa.aiarticleAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 14 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

First in Endor Labs' 10-part series on the OWASP Top 10 OSS Risks, this piece breaks down "Known Vulnerabilities" (OSS-RISK-1): how CVEs get assigned and disclosed, why the 2017 Apache Struts CVE-2017-5638 unpatched flaw led to the Equifax breach of 145M+ records, and how to compare vulnerability data sources (NVD, GitHub Advisory Database, OSV). It details prioritization methods — CVSS, EPSS, CISA KEV, SSVC, and function-level reachability analysis — and shows a case study where filtering 134K findings down via reachability, fix-availability, production-code, and EPSS thresholds cut remediation work by 99.97%.

endorlabs.comarticlePublished and added 11 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Adversa AI's September 2026 roundup of 15 GenAI security resources, grouped by attack technique, defense, threat modeling, red teaming, and training. Highlights include the OWASP LLM Top 10 2026 update (now blending 75% expert consensus with 25% incident data from 6,639 vulnerabilities, with eight of ten entries moving and System Prompt Leakage renamed Hidden Context Exposure), a memory-safety audit finding 10 vulnerabilities (including two use-after-frees at CVSS 9.2/8.1) in the C/C++ inference engine underlying Ollama, LM Studio, Jan and GPT4All, and research on stealing reasoning traces from proprietary LLM APIs, RAG document poisoning, and attention-collapse-based poisoning detection (D-SCAN).

adversa.aiarticleAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 9 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Adversa AI's monthly roundup of AI coding-agent security research, covering nine items: GhostJacking (using a WAF's own block logs as a prompt-injection delivery channel, 90% success against Claude Code), Black Hat disclosures of unauthenticated-issue-to-RCE chains in the default GitHub Actions configs published by Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI for their coding agents (Gemini CLI rated CVSS 10.0), an agent-to-agent privilege-boundary bypass in Google's ADK repository, the new OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 with a walkthrough showing open-source skill scanners miss encoded payloads while flagging 9-62% of legitimate skills as malicious, a seven-layer "secure agent harness" containment design, and a 2,826-file adversarial skill benchmark where Gemini CLI and Qwen Code were exploitable 95.5% and 71.6% of the time respectively. The piece draws a common thread across all findings: agents treat machine-generated artifacts (logs, images, other agents' outputs) as trusted instructions, and existing detection never fires.

adversa.aiarticleAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 3 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Endor Labs defines the "agentic development lifecycle" (ADLC) — the process by which AI coding agents autonomously plan, write, test, and ship code — and lays out where it introduces new security risk: insecure-by-default code, architectural design flaws that pass static analysis, hallucinated/unvetted dependencies, and a review bottleneck as agents outpace human reviewers. It cites benchmark data (62% of best-model BaxBench solutions insecure, only 10.5% of SWE-Agent/Claude 4 Sonnet solutions secure, only 1 in 5 AI-recommended dependency versions safe) and proposes a control stack — secure-generation prompting, security-aware multi-agent PR review, reachability-based prioritization, and automated remediation — mapped to NIST SP 800-218A, CSA's Agentic SDLC, and OWASP.

endorlabs.comarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 2 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

Endor Labs breaks down how indirect prompt injection compromises AI coding agents (Cursor, GitHub Copilot) via poisoned READMEs/rules files, malicious MCP servers, and web/issue content the agent reads with elevated trust and auto-approve permissions. Cites a study testing 314 payloads across 70 MITRE ATT&CK techniques showing up to 84% attack success, OWASP's MCP tool poisoning definition, Unit 42's real-world IDPI telemetry, and CVE-2025-52573 as a concrete command-injection-via-prompt-injection case in an MCP server.

endorlabs.comarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 2 Sep 2026🛡️ Security

tl;dr sec #343 is a weekly security newsletter issue. It covers AWSHound (SpecterOps' BloodHound OpenGraph collector for AWS IAM), TruffleHog AWS Analyze, JavaScript in HTML tag names (PortSwigger), and the Varonis CoSnitch Copilot flaw (CVE-2026-24301). It also covers the OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10, Cloudflare MCP traffic detection, a Datadog plan-mode versus default-mode secure coding test, and OpenClaw phishing tests.

tldrsec.comarticleAdded 30 Oct 2026, published 27 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Explains OWASP's Agentic Skills Top 10 v1.0 (AST01-AST10), a new framework for the risks of "agent skills" — folders with a SKILL.md file plus bundled code/scripts that agents discover and execute, treating plain-language instructions as an attack surface that neither traditional package security nor prompt-injection defenses cover. The piece details the ClawHavoc campaign (1,184 malicious skills across 12 ClawHub accounts), the ClawJacked exploit (CVE-2026-32025), Claude Code skill-related CVEs (CVE-2025-59536, CVE-2026-21852), and cites Adversa AI's own research showing a malicious skill bypassed all eight open-source scanners tested, including the OASB leaderboard leader and tools from NVIDIA (SkillSpector), Snyk, Trail of Bits, and Air Security. It closes with a prioritized remediation sequence (inventory, isolation, credential scoping, pinning, allowlisting, approval workflows, advisory scanning, cross-platform normalization) mapped to the AST entries.

adversa.aiarticleAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 25 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

A practical guide to web fuzzing for bug bounty hunters, covering wordlist selection (custom vs. SecLists-style generic lists), and tool-specific configuration for content discovery, subdomain/VHost enumeration, and parameter/header discovery using ffuf, Burp Suite Intruder, OWASP Amass, dnsx, Arjun, and Param Miner. It details concrete techniques such as subdomain permutation patterns, extension fuzzing for leftover files (.md, .env, .sql), dotfile/prefix patterns (/.FUZZ, /-FUZZ, /~FUZZ), IIS-specific extensions (.asmx, .ashx, .aspx.bak), and hidden-header fuzzing (X-Forwarded-For, X-Debug, X-HTTP-Method-Override) that can lead to SQLi, cache poisoning, or access-control bypass.

intigriti.comarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 21 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Recap of a Snyk "AI Security Engineers Community" livestream introducing Remediation Agent, now in public preview: an orchestration layer that sits between a developer's chosen LLM and Snyk's vulnerability intelligence (breakability assessments for OSS upgrades, package health/reachability scores, SAST fix generation, and ecosystem-specific upgrade playbooks) to auto-generate mergeable SCA and SAST fixes. It was demoed live against OWASP Juice Shop via the CLI (snyk fix --agentic --experimental --sca) and via an IDE path (Snyk Studio MCP server plus a /snyk-fix skill in Cursor, Windsurf, or VS Code), with Snyk reporting internal gains of 94% more mergeable SCA fixes and 13% more mergeable SAST fixes versus naively pointing an LLM at a vulnerability backlog.

snyk.ioarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 19 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Endor Labs explainer arguing that an AI agent's "harness" (orchestration loop, tool calling/MCP, memory, sandboxes, permission guardrails) - not the underlying LLM - is what determines both capability and attack surface. It walks through concrete harness-level risks (prompt injection as OWASP's LLM01, MCP servers as unvetted dependencies, permission sprawl) and pitches deterministic lifecycle hooks (as used in Claude Code/Cursor via Endor's AURI) as a jailbreak-proof control layer, citing Endor's Agent Security League benchmark where Cursor+Fable 5 beat Claude Code and Codex on both functional and security correctness.

endorlabs.comarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 15 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

0DIN (Mozilla's AI bug bounty program) announces it is expanding scope beyond inference-layer jailbreaks to agentic AI vulnerabilities — covering 29 products across coding agents, agentic browsers, enterprise agents, and general-purpose agents from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, Amazon and others. It introduces a new evaluation rubric for agentic submissions (violation class, impact severity, attack vector, scope) mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, and raises the bar for inference jailbreaks by requiring retargetability across two JEF-tested boundaries. The post cites real incidents including a Cursor agent token exfiltration, a malicious GitHub MCP integration issue, a rogue MCP server leaking WhatsApp histories, and CVE-2025-68664 (LangGrinch) affecting 847M LangChain downloads.

0din.aiarticlePublished and added 15 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Orca Security lays out a framework for securing AI agents as distinct security objects, arguing an agent's permission set can't be read off its code because it picks tools at runtime, unlike a fixed service account. It details identity-layer fixes from major providers — Microsoft Entra ID's blueprint/service-principal split, Google Cloud's per-agent SPIFFE/X.509 identity with 24-hour certs, and AWS Bedrock AgentCore's token-exchange delegation via RFC 8693 — plus OWASP's AI Agent Security Cheat Sheet practices (tool least privilege, memory isolation, approval gating, attribution logging) and EU AI Act Article 12 logging obligations for high-risk systems.

orca.securityarticlePublished and added 14 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Orca Security's guide to agentic AI security distinguishes it from AI-agent security by framing the unit of risk as the whole autonomous plan/sequence rather than a single agent, and walks through OWASP's Agentic Security Initiative Threats and Mitigations taxonomy (17 threats, T1-T17, v1.1) alongside CSA's MAESTRO layered framework. It details run-level controls (action-class approval thresholds, blast-radius caps, step/time/cost budgets, kill switches, egress boundaries, replayable audit logs) and identity/delegation concerns (RFC 8693 token exchange, orchestrator trust boundaries, permission inheritance across agent chains), then describes how Orca's agentless posture management maps AI services, keys, and data reachable by agentic workflows in the cloud.

orca.securityarticlePublished and added 14 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

ReversingLabs blog covering the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026, where excessive agency rises from sixth to third and misinformation and unbounded consumption move up. It explains the new ranking method (75% practitioner vote, 25% incident data from 7,714 incidents, 6,639 classified) and collects practitioner views. The core guidance is to assume models will be fooled and limit blast radius through scoped, short-lived credentials, external verification, and per-user and per-session budgets.

reversinglabs.comarticleAdded 20 Aug 2026, published 12 Aug 2026🛡️ Security

Adversa AI's August 2026 roundup of twenty agentic AI security resources from July 2026, covering four real-world agent exploits in ten days: a hidden one-pixel-text attack making AWS Kiro rewrite its own mcp.json (CVE-2026-10591), two CVSS 9.8 zero-click Cursor RCEs (DuneSlide, CVE-2026-50548/50549), the DeepJack Cursor deeplink RCE, and ClaudeBleed's Chrome-extension click-forgery against Claude for Chrome. It also summarizes three memory-poisoning papers (an agent data injection class, FARMA/SENTINEL, GhostWriter/AM-Sentry), the Hugging Face sandbox-escape incident, Anthropic's CISO risk framework, and OWASP/CSA's agentic AI maturity model.

adversa.aiarticleAdded 7 Oct 2026, published 31 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Endor Labs' 2026 SBOM tooling comparison sorts five tools into three functional layers: open-source generators (Syft, cdxgen, Microsoft SBOM Tool) that produce SPDX/CycloneDX inventories, OWASP Dependency-Track for centralized SBOM storage and continuous monitoring, and Endor Labs' own SBOM Hub which adds function-level reachability analysis to cut CVE alert noise by a claimed 95%. It breaks down each tool's ecosystem coverage, format support, and trade-offs (e.g., Syft's lack of reachability, cdxgen's CycloneDX-only output, Dependency-Track's need for a database) and gives a decision framework for picking a tool by stack and maturity level.

endorlabs.comarticleAdded 3 Sep 2026, published 29 Jul 2026🛡️ Security

Datadog describes its open-sourced AI-native SAST tool, which uses LLMs (including Claude Opus) to add context-aware reasoning on top of traditional static analysis, cutting false positives for vulnerabilities like SQL injection and command injection. The pipeline runs identification, context retrieval, LLM analysis, and post-processing steps, uses incremental scanning to control LLM cost after an initial full-repo scan, and is benchmarked against the OWASP Benchmark framework where it beats Datadog's traditional SAST (even LLM-filtered) on most vulnerability categories.

datadoghq.comarticlePublished and added 31 May 2026🛡️ Security

XBOW's blog post lays out a governance framework for AI-driven penetration testing, addressing authorization and scope, accountability and liability when autonomous agents cause unintended impact, and the need for explainable, validated findings rather than AI-generated guesses. It cites IBM's 2025 Cost of a Data Breach report (63% of breached orgs lack AI governance policies, 97% of AI-model breaches involved poor AI access controls) and OWASP access control testing stats to argue for enforceable scope boundaries, human oversight, and audit logging as autonomous testing scales.

xbow.comarticlePublished and added 23 May 2026🛡️ Security

OWASP's community-maintained catalog of application security tools that are free for open source projects, organized by category: SAST (GitHub CodeQL, Coverity, HCL AppScan CodeSweep), DAST (OWASP ZAP, StackHawk, Akto, Arachni), IAST (Contrast CE), software composition analysis/dependency scanning (Dependabot, Snyk, Mend, retire.js, Debricked), secrets detection (Gitleaks, TruffleHog, GitGuardian, Kingfisher), code quality (SonarQube, SpotBugs, MegaLinter), CI/CD security (GitLab built-ins, Faraday), and automatic remediation (Mobb, Corgea). It also covers newer entrants like Zennoxa Shield, cloud-audit, Cynative, and post-quantum crypto risk tools (CARAF, PQBench). Serves as a practical shopping list for securing an OSS project's SDLC end-to-end.

owasp.orgarticlePublished and added 6 May 2026🛡️ Security