Harvest now, decrypt later
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Adversaries store ciphertext until quantum computers can break the public key cryptography protecting it
Adversaries collect encrypted data today with the expectation that future quantum computers could decrypt it; cited as the primary risk driving confidentiality-focused PQC planning, contrasted with the authentication challenge this article addresses
Attackers collect encrypted data today (via protocols such as TLS, SSH, OpenPGP) to decrypt later once quantum computing capability exists; examined in Europol's report with University Carlos III of Madrid; no clear evidence yet of systematic exploitation at scale, with government communications and
Adversary captures encrypted traffic today to decrypt later once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists; motivates early migration of key exchange (ML-KEM) over signatures.
Identifying and neutralizing risk where data encrypted with quantum-vulnerable cryptography (e.g., weak key exchange protocols) is exposed, harvested by attackers, and decrypted once a CRQC is developed
Attackers may already be collecting encrypted data now so they can decrypt it later once large-scale quantum computers are available, as noted in the White House order
Attack where encrypted data is harvested now and decrypted later once quantum computers are capable, mitigated by PQC key exchange
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