x.comthreadAI Signal (@AliciaCrawoiue) on X
Commentary on Claude Code's newly shipped "mods" feature (TypeScript functions that hook into tool calls, permission prompts, and UI render events, distributed via plugins). The author warns the trust model is the real risk: a malicious mod hooked into the permission-prompt event can silently auto-approve tool calls, and without signed mods and permission manifests this extensibility surface could enable the first supply-chain attack against an agent user's production credentials.
TL;DR A tweet warns that Claude Code's new unsigned "mods" (plugin hooks into tool-call/permission events) could let a malicious mod silently auto-approve tool calls, risking a supply-chain attack on prod credentials.
Also seen from another angle🧠 AI →
Technologies named here
- Claude Code mods/plugins
- Claude Code
- TypeScript
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