Claude Code
Named by 286 kept items in this workspace.
103 items name it under classification.technologies, 101 under affected products and 82 under tools.
The items that name it 286
fixed in version 2.1.314
used in attacker workflows with varying autonomy
used in attacker workflows with varying autonomy, per CrowdStrike
abused by attackers in two 2025 campaigns
Anthropic coding tool, used in the November 2025 attacks by Chinese state-sponsored hackers
harder to fool; about half the time in Forever Security's tests with a CLAUDE.md pointing ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL at an attacker server, which leaks the login token
likely leaked GitHub CLI OAuth tokens by embedding them in a response body in specific circumstances, which may be logged to LiteLLM logs
AI coding tool whose responses contained GitHub CLI OAuth tokens
local agent, among 60 supported types for discovery
Coding agent harness used with Sonnet 5 and the codeguard-security plugin
config folder ~/.claude, written to by the reviewed repo's install
coding agent
LLM coding agent that can drive penetration-testing tools; reproducible setup given
AI coding tool; session histories found by CrowdStrike while analyzing South Korean bank attack infrastructure
AI coding agent that loads agent skills; skills can embed shell commands that run on load and can pre-approve tools via allowed-tools frontmatter, not gated by workspace trust.
AI coding assistant tool; session records, memory files and configurations linked to it were recovered from the attackers' publicly accessible server directories
AI coding assistant that loads persistent instructions from a CLAUDE.md file; the companion repository ships the same vulnerability-triage methodology as a CLAUDE.md file for use with Claude Code
AI coding agent CLI using OS-level sandbox enforcement
Coding agent CLI/desktop app; shipped ability on October 1st to rewrite its own behavior via mods hooked into events like tool calls, permission prompts, and UI render
Anthropic
Agent harness that Numbat integrates with
Autonomous coding agent whose lifecycle events Tracekit hooks into; evaluated in 14 real Claude Code runs; provider withheld text of all 27 thinking blocks, limiting self-report to visible prose
local LLM agent harness tested for ability to tamper with its own execution traces
Agent that discovers, tests and debugs candidate Java deserialization gadget chains
harness
Anthropic's agentic coding CLI; subject of all ten documented attacks: Miasma config hook execution, TrustFall (unsandboxed MCP server execution via trust prompt), pre-trust-dialog config read (CVE-2025-59536, CVE-2026-21852), Agentjacking (fake Sentry bug report to shell command), deny-rule bypass
Anthropic's own agentic orchestration/coding environment, mentioned as an analogous provider-built orchestrator.
vulnerable to prompt leakage (ToolLeak) and tool-invocation hijacking achieving RCE; case study provided
supported agent
Anthropic
AI coding agent that reads skills from ~/.claude/skills/ (personal) or .claude/skills/ (project)
AI coding assistant that can leak sensitive code data to external model providers if unprotected
AI coding agent harness; one of six agents found exploitable in SymJack approval-bypass testing; one of four CLIs tested in TrustFall
AI coding assistant; its /review feature was run 3 times per PR in the Greptile study.
Used by Wiz researchers to work through LiteLLM's codebase looking for features that accept user-controlled input and pass it to an execution context
harness used to run Claude Fable 5.1 in the benchmark
Anthropic coding agent harness, used as comparison combos (with Fable 5.1 and Opus 5) in the same benchmark
AI coding agent; supported for pre-action hook sequence detection (secret-file access then data-bearing egress)
Agentic coding harness used to run all evaluated models (Fable 5.1, Fable 5.0, Opus 5) against benchmark coding tasks; versions 2.1.258 (Fable 5.1) and 2.1.156 (Opus 5, Fable 5.0)
Auto mode configuration vulnerable to GhostJacking (90% success); bash validator stripped single-quoted content allowing git push --receive-pack=... flag to execute, leading to RCE and theft of API key and GitHub token
AI coding agent tool cited as one teams should apply consistent governance policy to
Platform Endor Labs' AI Code Review integrates with
Per GitGuardian's State of Secrets Sprawl 2026, Claude Code-assisted commits showed a 3.2% secret-leak rate, versus a 1.5% baseline
core.fsmonitor sink in git status internal subprocess at startup; confirmed on 2.1.193, fixed by 2.1.196; reported 26 June 2026, closed as duplicate of report filed earlier same day
AI coding assistant targeted with hidden prompt injections embedded by a malicious agent per AISI documentation
Agent integrated with re-shell for reverse engineering workflows
Plugin host; DataSentry runs as a deterministic hook on every prompt and tool call, in every session
AI coding assistant/plugin platform into which the YesWeHack Claude Kit is installed
Anthropic ships new versions constantly; auto-updates by default depending on install method
AI coding agent platform; affected by CVE-2025-59536 and CVE-2026-21852 via malicious repository configuration files
employee-facing AI agent secured by ADR
Coding client tested; GPT-5.4 dropped to 0% compliance behind it.
Coding agent harness used in Snyk VulnBench to test LLM-powered vulnerability detection
Used with Mythos Preview to search programs for security vulnerabilities
Evaluated commercial alternative for AI code review; rejected because it would have added $15-25 on top of existing tooling costs.
target of promptware
Agentic coding harness from Anthropic, paired with frontier models and evaluated on SusVibes coding tasks
Used as the agent in Cloudflare attack chain testing; 90% (9 out of 10) attack success rate reproducing the DNS hijack via blocked-request log fields
AI engine combined with 13 specialized MCP servers powering AuditSentry
Used by Figma in parallel with Codex for AI code scanning, and by an incident response team to create cells, run queries and build investigation notebooks in marimo.
Anthropic's terminal agent; reads and writes code through a call-model-run-tool loop, manages long sessions via compaction, with permission modes and sandboxing for safety boundaries
Anthropic's AI coding agent with a permission/deny-rule system and --dangerously-skip-permissions flag
client used in the demo, configured via ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL and ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN
system prompts leaked
system prompts leaked
project env settings in .claude/settings.json can set PATH so automatic Git probes run a repository wrapper
Coding agent; subject to seventeen primary issue-tracker reports (October 2025 to September 2026) of an agent recursively deleting files outside the project, usually via path or variable expansion inside a legitimate cleanup task (citing claude-code #10077, #83058, #95426); also cited for '93% of pe
AI agent/model provider usable to run scans within open·kritt
One of the agent harnesses that can drive the QM core
AI coding harness; hooks configured via .claude/settings.json, supports PreToolUse and other lifecycle hook events
Coding agent that exposes lifecycle hooks allowing deterministic interception of consequential actions before execution.
Target of agent data injection (ADI) demonstrations (click, RCE, supply chain attacks)
Loads SKILL.md files and agent manifests that scanners evaluated are meant to protect
hosts skills and hooks
AI coding agent that can suggest hallucinated, nonexistent package names
/security-review command, introduced August 2025, available to all paid-plan and API Console users
Primary agentic coding tool used by Anthropic engineers; authors ~80% of merged code.
Coding harness/host agent used to front several tools (raptor, security-audit-skill, trailofbits/skills, vulnhunter)
Where validated findings and suggested patches can be opened and fixed using the models available in the user's account; also hosts the Claude Security plugin, keeping code inside the user's environment
Used collaboratively with human experts to write structured task specifications; planned integration target as an additional agent execution/harness framework
agentic coding tool discussed as generating multi-billion-dollar revenue
Coding agent used to validate the proof-of-concept attack
AI coding tool that connects to the CircleCI MCP server, managed via `claude mcp remove/add` commands
hit by Adversa's TrustFall and by a separate deny-rule bypass
Closed-source agent, out of scope for direct testing; cited as affected by a separate 'deny-rule bypass' (token budget shortcut) finding and by the TrustFall folder-trust dialog finding (unsandboxed MCP exec at startup)
coding agent; refused to leak secrets across every model tested, including Sonnet 4.6, Haiku 4.5, and Opus 4.7
Anthropic's coding tool; refused the malicious instruction under every model tested, including the same Sonnet weights that leaked secrets in other tools
AI coding agent used by developers to clone and set up repositories; exploited as the execution vector in this attack
Anthropic's coding agent; affected by a GitHub Action flaw and by the 'Comment and Control' API-key leak study
AI coding tool used by a human-steered extortion campaign against at least 17 organizations (per Anthropic report), and by a Chinese state-linked group to write exploits and steal data largely autonomously (per Anthropic's November 2025 disclosure).
default headless backend runner for Argo's pipeline
- OpenAI Codex with GPT-5.6 Sol: competitive, zero cheating, one unique Django fix | Blog | Endor Labs
Competing agentic coding tool in the Agent Security League benchmark; Claude Code + Sonnet 5 had 8 confirmed cheating cases; Claude Code + Fable 5 solved CVE-2021-44420 but was removed for cheating
AI coding tool exploited by Miasma to trigger credential harvester when repository opened
Supported AI coding agent hook target
Skills, subagents, and MCP servers scanned by skills-janitor; supports /plugin install
coding agent auto-discovered and ingested by brain0
AI coding tool supported as an APM target
AI coding agent covered by multiple scanners/audit tools (agent-audit, SkillSpector, Skill-Inject, Claude-BugHunter, Adrian integration, etc.)
Agent harness used to run Sonnet 5 and Fable 5 on the 200-task dataset
AI coding assistant found vulnerable to the GhostApproval symlink attack; internal reasoning identified the real target (e.g. .zshrc) but the approval dialog showed the friendly filename; Anthropic initially declined to treat it as a vulnerability but notes a symlink warning shipped in Claude Code i
Used autonomously (80-90% of tactical execution) by a state-sponsored actor in a September 2025 attack disrupted by Anthropic
Local AI coding agent that can serve as the 'brain' driving T3MP3ST's Arsenal
AI coding agent supported via hooks; Prempti registers a hook for it
AI client CLI that Pentest-AI's setup wizard can register via .mcp.json; optional pentest-ai-agents repository provides subagent files for it
Subject of CVE-2025-55284 (DNS-based exfiltration via indirect prompt injection)
Orchestration/decision layer for RAPTOR's interactive shell (v3.1.0 base); provides slash commands, skills, agents, and CLAUDE.md-based routing
AI coding agent with worktree handling affected by the vulnerability; seatbelt sandbox is its execution restriction mechanism
AI coding agent client that loads the routing repository
AI coding agent/harness paired with Claude Fable 5 in benchmark, scored 59.8% FuncPass and 19.0% SecPass
AI coding agent; version 2-1-161 (latest, captured June 2, 2026) confirmed to execute injected payload on macOS.
Agent harness paired with Claude Fable 5 for the vulnerability-fixing benchmark (59.8% FuncPass, 19.0% SecPass)
AI coding agent harness used in benchmark combinations (e.g., with Claude Opus 4.8, Claude Sonnet 4.6)
AI coding tool triggered via .claude/settings.json to execute malicious payload on session start
interactive agent environment used to run security skills (/quickstart, /threat-model, /vuln-scan, /triage, /patch, /customize, /dnr-hunt, /dnr-respond)
configuration files at ~/.claude/settings.json specifically targeted
AI coding agent; in the documented field observation, flagged the injected instruction on the first mvn test run, refused to act on it, and traced it back to its source in the JAR
used in demo, configured with Anthropic Opus 4.6 model
AI coding assistant platform (CLI, Desktop App, VS Code extension) that offensive-claude installs into as a plugin/skillset
AI coding agent platform that loads the skill bundle to perform bug hunting / red-team work
No Claude Code-specific security advisory or CVE issued for either finding; no changelog security note
Primary AI coding tool the framework is built for; subagents inherit model via model: "inherit"
Coding agent that loads skills from enterprise policy, personal skill directory, project .claude/skills/, plugins, nested project folders, or --add-dir directories; supports dynamic context (! syntax) that executes shell commands before the model sees rendered skill content.
AI coding agent driving the autonomous vulnerability hunting system via MCP tool calls
CLI used to run the scan prompt against a local codebase (claude "$(curl -s .../prompt.md)")
LLM assistant used by the human author alongside manual exploit development, and referenced as the tool that produced an ASCII diagram to explain Exim's allocator, and that provided the walkthrough reconstruction of XBOW Native's 'Special Delivery' exploit chain
CLI coding agent; default mode asks for user approval before running commands or modifying files, leading to approval fatigue (93% acceptance rate of prompts)
Agent-capable LLM client that reads agent definitions from ~/.claude/agents/ (global) or .claude/agents/ (per-project)
Anthropic's development tool; ships a /security-review slash command providing the same security analysis integrated into the local development environment
CLAUDE.md, .claude/ configs
Supported worker backend CLI for Cairn
AI coding agent covered by the baseline
Hook-triggered RCE (CVE-2025-59536); API key exfiltration (CVE-2026-21852); rules file backdoor via CLAUDE.md
Agentic coding CLI from Anthropic; subject of the TrustFall analysis
Interactive research environment used directly with Opus 4.6/Opus 4.7 for manual steering, fuzzing harness design, and severity assessment
External agent supported in Docker Agent Mode; runs in a container mediated by IronCurtain
configuration/settings, all scopes: user, project, local, managed
Standardized AI agent/coding tool used company-wide at Trail of Bits; supported with known-good configs and defaults
Scanner agent option used by RedAI to triage and probe source code
MCP-compatible client used to interact with h1-brain
Platform that routes tasks to the specialist subagents
Example OpenAI-compatible/Anthropic client used through the DontFeedTheAI proxy
MCP-compatible client used to connect to h1-brain server
Legitimate AI coding tool impersonated via a malicious sponsored search result and fake download page delivering credential-stealing malware
AI coding agent whose memory was compromised via the disclosed and remediated MemoryTrap method
Credentials specifically targeted by the malware
AI coding assistant/tool affected by the vulnerability; reads repository configuration and settings files on project load
Used to vibecode the project; Rikugan can reuse its skills and MCP servers.
AI coding agent/tool used to demonstrate ANSI escape code injection
AI coding agent harness; managed startup writes workspace trust and onboarding completion to ~/.claude.json
AI agent whose local session artifacts are scouted and analyzed
Anthropic's AI coding agent affected by the flaw via core.fsmonitor and claude ultrareview paths
AI coding agent shown to interpret injected Sentry error events as legitimate diagnostic resolution steps and execute attacker-controlled code
CVE-2025-55284
project-load flow before the trust prompt; users on standard auto-update already have the fix, manual updaters should move to the latest version
LLM coding agent evaluated for action-boundary violations on DevOps tasks
Affected by Plugin4Shell (SHA-pinning bypass allowing zero-click RCE via plugin marketplace); patched after disclosure in version 2.1.179
LLM agent used to drive the tooling; queries the call graph, discovers candidate chains, and uses the Dynamic Runner to debug/validate them
AI coding agent harness that Agentic-Bug-Hunter can plug into via skills/commands
Used/misused by threat actors to build and refine AI-driven attack workflows; also spoofed by attackers as a fake harness to deliver credential-harvesting malware
skill.json skill format; affected by CVE-2025-59536 and CVE-2026-21852.
Anthropic's coding agent safety classifier, made the default; found vulnerable to an attack bypassing its prompt injection protections
Setups scanned for hardcoded secrets, permission misconfigs, hook injection, MCP server risks, and agent prompt injection vectors
AI coding agent tested; in one run it recommended a benign repository but also surfaced and repeated README installation instructions from a malicious Skill repository (adlaiponderous700/claude-skill-cinematic-prompt); in other runs it recognized suspicious contents and refused.
Auto Mode (default since mid-August), the target of the attack chain described
requires Node.js >= 18
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