
Faster and Smaller Anonymous Credentials from Standardized Signatures
GordieHowe is a language, certifying compiler and zero-knowledge proof system for building anonymous credentials on standardized signatures (ECDSA, RSA, ML-DSA). It proves an ECDSA-signed mobile driving license presentation in 64.8 ms with a 276 KiB proof, 10.1x faster than Google's Longfellow, and an ML-DSA-44 signature in 87.3 ms with at least 116 bits of quantum security. Compiler output and security theorems are checked in Lean. It introduces series-parallel IOPs and extends the BCS transformation in the QROM.
What it is
GordieHowe is a language, a certifying compiler and a zero-knowledge proof protocol from Chad Sharp and Paul Grubbs (University of Michigan). It targets anonymous credentials built on standardized signatures: ECDSA, RSA and ML-DSA. The paper is an IACR ePrint preprint (2026/2615), received 23 October 2026 and not yet peer reviewed. The authors claim it is the first system to combine three properties: provable security against quantum attackers, efficient statements spanning multiple fields (with proving and verifying in parallel), and automatic batching of structured computations.
Benchmarks
All proving times are in parallel on four cores. The paper does not state the hardware.
| Statement | Time | Proof size | Security |
|---|---|---|---|
| ECDSA-signed mobile driving license presentation | 64.8 ms | 276 KiB | not stated for this row |
| SHA3-256 preimage, 1 KiB | 5.0 ms | 60 KiB | at least 101 bits knowledge soundness (random oracle model) |
| RSA-2048 signature on private 2 KiB message | 25.9 ms | 210 KiB | at least 101 bits knowledge soundness (random oracle model) |
| ML-DSA-44 signature on private message | 87.3 ms | 549 KiB | at least 116 bits against quantum adversaries |
The baseline is Google's Longfellow. The mobile driving license proof is 10.1x faster and 22% smaller. The ML-DSA-44 proof is 70.2x faster and 29% smaller than an optimized Longfellow circuit. The ML-DSA comparison is against an optimized circuit, so it is not a stock-versus-stock figure.
Assurance design
- The language is built for static checking of bounds safety, which prevents integer overflows.
- The compiler emits a Lean certificate that its optimizations preserve the semantics of the input program.
- The proof system's security theorems are machine-checked in Lean.
Theory contributions
The paper defines series-parallel IOPs, interactive oracle proofs whose messages are partially ordered. It extends the BCS transformation to them, with knowledge soundness and zero-knowledge proofs in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). The authors also show a form of simulation extractability for the extended BCS in the QROM, and say they believe this is the first such result of any kind for BCS in the QROM.
Caveats
The quantum-secure figure (116 bits) applies only to the ML-DSA result. The classical rows are at least 101 bits in the random oracle model. The page does not mention a code release, the benchmark hardware, verifier-side timings or memory use, so an engineer evaluating adoption would need the full paper for those.
Organisations named here
- BCS transformation
- GordieHowe
- Longfellow
- mobile driving license
- series-parallel IOP
Technologies named here
- ECDSA
- ML-DSA
- RSA
- Lean
- SHA3-256
Techniques named here
- Series-parallel IOP
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