Skip to content

Back to the catalog

openid.netpaper

Identity Management for Agentic AI [pdf] (2025)

OpenID Foundation whitepaper (Oct 2025, lead editor Tobin South) analyzing how authentication/authorization for AI agents differs from traditional software clients. It covers where OAuth 2.1, OIDC, SSO/SCIM, and MCP already work for single-domain synchronous agents, and lays out unsolved problems for autonomous agentic identity: agent identity fragmentation across vendors, replacing user impersonation with explicit delegated "on-behalf-of" authority, consent-fatigue at scale, recursive delegation chains between sub-agents, agents acting for teams of users, and browser/computer-use agents bypassing API-based authorization entirely.

TL;DR OpenID Foundation whitepaper mapping OAuth2.1/OIDC/SCIM/MCP's current fit for AI agent auth and the open problems in agent identity, delegated authority, and consent at scale.
Also seen from another angle🧠 AI →
Document

What it is

A 28-page OpenID Foundation whitepaper (Oct 2025) structured in two halves: Section 2 catalogs which existing standards already cover agent auth today, Section 3 scopes out the unsolved problems. The existing summary already captures the problem list from Section 3. What it omits is the concrete Section 2 guidance — the specific standards mapping and named working groups an implementer would actually go use today.

What to do

The paper's actionable layer, not covered in the summary:

  • MCP's auth evolution: the protocol's initial spec shipped with no authentication; later revisions added it. Anyone integrating MCP should check which spec version they're building against rather than assume auth was there from the start.
  • Dynamic Client Registration is called out as a distinct, necessary mechanism for agents (Section 2.5) — relevant because agents proliferate client instances in a way traditional OAuth clients don't, and manual client registration doesn't scale to that.
  • Asynchronous authorization gets its own section (2.7) as a gap area even within "solved" single-domain cases — i.e., OAuth 2.1's synchronous consent flow doesn't map cleanly even for agents operating in one trust domain if they act after the user has left the loop.
  • IPSIE (Interoperability Profiling for Secure Identity in the Enterprise) is named as the specific working group producing interoperable profiles for enterprise AI agent conformance — a concrete pointer for enterprise security leads who want to track or contribute to standards work rather than wait for a finished spec.
  • The paper explicitly scopes out web-search and computer-use agents from its core analysis (treating them as "important but out of scope"), even though the executive summary flags browser/computer-use agents as breaking the authorization paradigm — so readers looking for a treatment of that specific problem won't find depth here, just a flagged gap.

Caveats

This is Section 1-2 territory only (pages 1–9 of the fetched text); the document's actual proposed solutions for the Section 3 hard problems (delegation chains, team-based agents, etc.) aren't in the fetched content, so this analysis can't confirm whether the paper offers concrete mechanisms there or only frames the open questions.

Organisations named here

  • IPSIE
  • Loyal Agents Initiative
  • OpenID Foundation

Technologies named here

  • ChatGPT
  • Model Context Protocol
  • Agent-to-Agent Protocol
  • Claude
  • Gemini
  • OAuth 2.1
  • OpenID Connect
  • LLaMa
  • Enterprise SSO
  • SCIM provisioning
  • OAuth
  • OIDC
  • SCIM
  • A2A

Techniques named here

  • User impersonation by agents
  • Recursive delegation
  • Consent fatigue / reflexive approval
  • Browser/computer-use agent authorization bypass