
Nowhere Man: Device Binding for Post-Quantum Anonymous Credentials
Presents a modular device-binding protocol for post-quantum anonymous credentials. The phone Secure Element signs a verifier challenge with an unmodified FIPS 204 ML-DSA interface, and the user proves knowledge of that signature in zero knowledge at each presentation. Using ML-DSA's structure avoids the cost of generic NIZK systems such as Longfellow. The most efficient variants assume weak-MLWR for unlinkability, and that assumption can be dropped at some efficiency cost. The protocol works with different anonymous credential schemes, and a proof-of-concept implementation is included. This matters for planned EU age-verification and Google Wallet/mDL rollouts, which need protection against credential sharing.
Organisations named here
- FIPS 204
- mDL
- ML-DSA
- Vega
- weak-MLWR assumption
Technologies named here
- Anonymous credential deployments
- Longfellow
- Google Wallet
- Vega
- mobile Driver License framework
- ML-DSA
- Phone Secure Element
- ML-DSA standardized post-quantum signature scheme
Techniques named here
- Device binding
Related in Identity & Access
Education Under Attack: The Pattern Behind Recent University Breaches
Next-Gen Phishing Tactics Users Aren’t Ready For | Huntress
.png)
Google API keys keep working after you delete them
